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Legal Information and the Development of American Law: 
Writings on the Form and Structure of the Published Law*
Richard	A.	Danner**
Robert C. Berring’s writings about the impacts of electronic databases, the 
Internet, and other communications technologies on legal research and prac-
tice are an essential part of a larger literature that explores the ways in which 
the forms and structures of published legal information have influenced how 
American lawyers think about the law. Professor Danner reviews Berring’s 
writings, along with those of other writers concerned with these questions, 
focusing on the implications of Berring’s idea that in the late nineteenth cen-
tury American legal publishers created a “conceptual universe of thinkable 
thoughts” through which U.S. lawyers came to view the law. He concludes 
that, spurred by Berring and others, the literature of legal information has 
become far-reaching in scope and interdisciplinary in approach, while the 
themes struck in Berring’s work continue to inform the scholarship of newer 
writers.
¶1	In	his	2000	article,	“Legal	Information	and	the	Search	for	Cognitive	Authority,”	
Robert	C.	Berring	wrote	that	“despite	the	centrality	of	legal	information	to	the	legal	
culture,	commentators	have	long	neglected	to	take	a	serious	approach	to	analyzing	
legal	information.”1	Berring’s	own	writings	are	not	the	only	serious	work	on	the	role	
of	legal	information	in	American	legal	culture,	but	they	are	essential	to	any	serious	
consideration	of	the	topic.	His	articles	exploring	the	impacts	of	technological	change	
on	 legal	 research	and	 the	 legal	publishing	 industry	may	have	been	written	 less	 to	
construct	a	model	for	the	role	of	legal	information	in	American	legal	culture	than	
to	examine	 the	effects	of	 those	changes	on	 the	modern	 legal	 information	 system.	
But,	by	basing	his	commentary	on	the	impacts	of	technological	change	in	the	late	
twentieth	century	in	a	historical	discussion	of	the	legal	information	systems	that	had	
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	 1.	 Robert	C.	Berring,	Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority,	88	Cal. l. Rev. 1673,	
1676	 (2000)	 [hereinafter	 Berring,	Cognitive Authority].	 Berring	 explained	 this	 lack	 of	 interest	 in	
part	as	a	reflection	of	how	well	the	legal	information	system	has	worked,	and	on	general	agreement	
in	the	legal	culture	to	confer	cognitive,	or	trusted,	authority	on	a	small	set	of	legal	sources.	Id.	See 
also Steven	M.	Barkan,	Book	Review,	10	n. ill. U. l. Rev.	365,	365	(1990)	(reviewing	M. ethan 
Katsh, the eleCtRoniC Media and the tRansFoRMation oF law (1989))	(“This	dearth	of	activity	
is	particularly	troublesome	because	of	the	intimate	relationship	that	exists	between	law	and	its	infor-
mational	sources.”).
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emerged	 in	 the	 late	1800s,	Berring	developed	a	paradigm	for	understanding	 legal	
information	in	the	United	States	that	influenced	his	immediate	contemporaries	and	
later	writers.2	Nearly	everything	else	written	on	the	topic	accepts	and	elaborates	on	
Berring’s	 ideas.	Because	his	 ideas	have	been	so	widely	accepted,	anyone	wishing	
to	understand	the	influences	of	legal	information	on	American	legal	culture	and	the	
development	of	American	law	must	start	with	an	understanding	of	the	model	that	he	
developed	over	the	course	of	his	research	and	ruminations.	
¶2	Berring	emphasized	 the	historical	 role	of	 the	West	Publishing	Company,	 the	
preeminent	publisher	of	American	law,	suggesting	that	West’s	comprehensive	publish-
ing,	 classification,	 and	 indexing	 systems	 had	 influenced	 not	 only	 the	 structure	 and	
distribution	of	legal	information	in	the	United	States,	but	American	legal	thought	itself.	
Berring	found	that	“[t]he	confluence	of	Blackstone’s	categorization	structure,	[West’s]	
American	Digest	System,	legal	education,	and	all	of	those	trained	within	it	have	cre-
ated	a	conceptual	universe	of	 thinkable	 thoughts	 that	has	enormous	power.”3	As	he	
wrote	at	the	start	of	the	twenty-first	century,	however,	this	conceptual	universe	that	had	
ruled	legal	thinking	for	more	than	a	century	was	dying	due	to	changes	in	the	technolo-
gies	of	information	retrieval	and	the	structures	of	the	legal	publishing	industry.4	
¶3	This	article	traces	the	influences	of	two	elements	of	Berring’s	“conceptual	
universe	of	thinkable	thoughts”5:	the	impacts	of	the	categories	of	the	West	Digest	
System	on	how	American	 lawyers	 understand	 and	 think	 about	 the	 law;	 and	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 the	 conceptual	 universe	 was	 “closed,”	 limiting	 the	 acceptable	
sources	of	 law	 to	published	cases—in	practical	 terms,	 to	cases	published	 in	 the	
West	 National	 Reporter	 System.	 The	 article	 first	 attempts	 to	 identify	 the	 key	
	 2.	 The	usual	starting	point	for	considering	the	role	of	paradigms	in	any	discipline	is	thoMas s. KUhn, 
the stRUCtURe oF sCientiFiC RevolUtions	 (3d	 ed.	1996).	For	Kuhn,	paradigms	“provide	models	
from	which	spring	particular	coherent	traditions	of	scientific	research.	.	 .	 .	[Those]	whose	research	
is	based	on	shared	paradigms	are	committed	to	the	same	rules	and	standards	for	scientific	practice.	
That	commitment	and	the	apparent	consensus	it	produces	are	prerequisites	for	.	 .	 .	 the	genesis	and	
continuation	of	a	particular	research	tradition.”	Id.	at	11.	
	 	 	 For	 discussions	 of	 paradigms	 for	 legal	 information	 and	 legal	 research,	 see	 Carol	 M.	 Bast	 &	
Ransford	C.	 Pyle,	Legal Research in the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift,	 93	law libR. J. 285,	
286–89,	2001	law libR. J.	13,	¶¶	5–14;	Barbara	Bintliff,	Context and Legal Research,	99	law libR. 
J. 249,	254–57,	2007	law libR. J.	15,	¶¶	22–32;	F.	Allan	Hanson,	From Key Numbers to Keywords: 
How Automation Has Transformed the Law,	94	law libR. J. 563,	564,	2002	law libR. J.	36,	¶	2	
[hereinafter	Hanson,	From Key Numbers to Keywords].	Berring	discussed	old	 and	new	paradigms	
of	 legal	 research	 in	Robert	C.	Berring,	Full-Text Databases and Legal Research: Backing into the 
Future,	1 high teCh. l.J. 27	 (1986)	 [hereinafter	Berring,	Full-Text Databases],	 and	 occasionally	
employed	the	concept	in	later	articles.	See, e.g.,	Robert	C.	Berring,	Collapse of the Structure of the 
Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of Digital Information,	 69	wash. l. Rev. 9,	 27	 (1994)	
[hereinafter	Berring,	Collapse of the Structure]	(“[W]e	are	 in	 the	midst	of	a	major	paradigm	shift.	
Legal	information	is	out	of	control.”).	
	 3.	 Robert	C.	Berring,	Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts,	2	J. app. pRaC. & pRoCess 
305,	311	(2000)	[hereinafter	Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts].	
	 4.	 Id.
	 5.	 As	discussed	 in	 greater	 depth	 in	 the	next	 section	of	 this	 article,	Berring	 explained	 the	 concept	 of	
“thinkable	thoughts”	in	terms	of	the	effects	of	initial	categorization	and	classification	systems	on	how	
researchers	and	others	define	and	think	about	fields	of	inquiry.	Once	in	place	and	accepted	as	authori-
tative,	classification	systems	define	the	limits	of	thinkable	thoughts	within	a	field.	Id.	at	310–11.	
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features	of	Berring’s	 thinking	as	developed	in	his	writings.	It	 then	discusses	 the	
influences	of	his	work	on	other	writers.	The	final	section	critiques	the	model	that	
emerges	from	his	writings	and	offers	some	thoughts	on	what	approaches	are	best	
suited	for	examining	the	role	of	legal	information	in	the	twenty-first	century,	both	
within	particular	jurisdictions	and	for	comparative	purposes.
Berring’s Works
Early Works: Focus on West
¶4	 In	 “Full-Text	 Databases	 and	 Legal	 Research:	 Backing	 into	 the	 Future,”	 pub-
lished	in	the	1986	premiere	issue	of	the	University	of	California,	Berkeley’s	High 
Technology Law Review,	Berring	posited	the	need	for	more	research	“on	the	relation	
between	the	structure	of	legal	literature	and	the	substantive	development	of	law,”	not-
ing	that	“in	law,	more	than	any	other	discipline,	the	structure	of	the	literature	implies	
the	structure	of	the	enterprise	itself.”6	At	the	outset	of	the	article,	Berring	stated	his	
intention	 to	 explore	 these	 relationships	 by	 assessing	 the	 influences	 of	 the	 “tradi-
tional	hard-copy	primary	sources”	on	the	lawyering	process,7	and	quoted	Langdell’s	
well-known	comparison	of	the	role	of	the	law	school	library	for	lawyers	to	those	of	
the	laboratory	for	chemists	and	the	museum	for	naturalists.8	A	year	later,	in	“Legal	
Research	and	Legal	Concepts:	Where	Form	Molds	Substance,”	he	strengthened	his	
initial	proposition	about	the	role	of	legal	information	with	the	statement	that	“[f]rom	
the	 late	nineteenth	century,	 the	development	of	 the	American	 legal	system	can	be	
seen	as	a	history	of	the	development	of	forms	of	legal	publication,”	and	the	question	
“whether	the	forms	of	publication	have	been	mere	vehicles	for	the	transmission	of	
legal	knowledge	or	 important	 influences	 in	 the	development	of	 that	knowledge,”9	
again	citing	Langdell’s	statement	about	the	role	of	the	library.10
¶5	These	first	articles	and	those	that	followed	each	grapple	with	one	or	more	
aspects	of	the	impacts	of	new	information	technologies	on	legal	information	and	
the	practice	of	legal	research.	Each	also	develops	the	broader	project	of	examining	
the	influences	of	the	forms	and	structures	of	legal	information	on	the	development	
of	American	 law,	particularly	 those	of	 the	publication,	classification,	and	 index-
ing	systems	devised	by	the	West	Publishing	Company	in	the	final	quarter	of	the	
nineteenth	century.11
	 6.	 Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	29.
	 7.	 Id.
	 8.	 Id.	at	29	n.9	(citing	haRvaRd law sChool ass’n, the Centennial histoRy oF the haRvaRd law 
sChool 1817–1917,	at	97	(1918)	(“The	library	is	to	us	what	the	laboratory	is	to	the	chemist	or	the	
physicist	and	what	the	museum	is	to	the	naturalist.”)).
	 9.	 Robert	C.	Berring,	Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance,	75	Cal. l. 
Rev. 15,	15	(1987)	[hereinafter	Berring,	Form Molds Substance].
	 10.	 Id.	at	15	n.1.
	 11.	 Berring’s	articles	also	discuss	the	role	of	Shepard’s Citations.	See, e.g., Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	
supra	 note	 1,	 at	 1695–96.	For	 a	 history	 of	 legal	 citators,	 see	Patti	Ogden,	Mastering the Lawless 
Science of Our Law: A Story of Legal Citation Indexes,	85	law libR. J.	1	(1993).
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¶6	Berring’s	 early	articles	provide	a	 rich	history	of	West	 and	 the	 influences	
of	its	approaches	both	to	the	publication	and	organization	of	appellate	cases	and	
to	 indexing	 and	 digesting.12	 Already	 in	 1986,	 he	 noted	 that	 West’s	 American	
Digest	System	was	“the	key	aspect	of	 the	new	form	of	 legal	 literature”	 that	 the	
company	created.13	The	West	digest	classification	system	was	a	“universal	subject	
thesaurus,”	a	format	that	“allowed	and	encouraged	lawyers	to	fit	every	legal	issue	
into	a	certain	conceptual	framework,”	providing	not	only	the	means	for	locating	
precedent,	but	“a	paradigm	for	thinking	about	the	law	itself.”14	Once	exposed	to	
the	West	Key	Number	System,	“[l]awyers	began	 to	 think	according	 to	 the	West	
categories.”15	Berring	described	the	West	digest	as	the	“internal,	mediating	struc-
ture	within	the	old	mode	of	[legal]	discourse.	.	.	.	The	location	of	issues	and	cases	
in	the	old	paradigm	was	part	of	their	meaning,”	providing	“a	substantive	context,	
a	setting	that	told	the	searcher	the	meaning	of	the	case	as	much	as	did	the	opinion	
itself.”16	West	 had	 created	 a	 new	 form	 of	 legal	 literature	with	 its	 reporters	 and	
digests	in	the	late	1800s.	In	the	last	quarter	of	the	twentieth	century,	the	full-text	
online	 database	 vendors	 were	 creating	 another	 new	 form	 of	 literature	 that	 was	
“more	or	less	identical	in	content	to	the	old	West	system,	but	is	accessible	in	an	
entirely	new	way.”17	With	full-text	searching,	however,	 the	context	and	meaning	
provided	by	the	digests	were	lost.
¶7	 In	 1987,	 Berring	 moved	 his	 thoughts	 regarding	 the	 National	 Reporter	
System	and	 the	American	Digest	System	 into	a	broader	historical	discussion	of	
the	 role	 of	 legal	 information	 in	 the	 development	 of	English	 and	American	 law.	
For	Berring,	“the	earliest	forms	of	modern	legal	research	materials	began	to	take	
shape	in	the	eighteenth	century,”	when	Blackstone’s	Commentaries	presented	law	
as	“a	body	of	knowledge	that	had	its	own	structure	and	was	reducible	to	rational	
propositions.”18	Influenced	by	Locke	and	Newton,	Blackstone	used	natural	law	to	
provide	 “the	 assurance	 that	 there	was	 a	 structure,	 an	 absolute	 foundation,	 upon	
which	to	build	the	rational	system	[of	common	law].”19	With	this	framework	estab-
lished,	judicial	reports	“could	be	used	as	indicia	of	the	larger	structure	.	.	.	[,]	the	
embodiment	of	the	common	law.”20
	 12.	 See, e.g.,	 Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 29–33.	See also eRwin C. sURRenCy, a 
histoRy oF aMeRiCan law pUblishing 237–42	(1990).	The	official	company	history	is	williaM w. 
MaRvin, west pUblishing CoMpany: oRigin, gRowth, leadeRship (1969).
	 13.	 Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	31.
	 14.	 Id.	at	32–33.	Berring	noted	that	West’s	thesaurus	was	not	“truly	universal,”	but	limited	to	the	“legal	
universe.”	Id.	at	32	n.24.
	 15.	 Id.	at	33.
	 16.	 Id.	at	54.	
	 17.	 Id.	“Found	cases	 that	are	relevant	are	 like	prizes	 in	a	computer	game,	 rather	 than	 instantiations	of	
the	legal	and	socially	appropriate	categories	of	the	West	Digest.”	Id.	Berring	goes	on	to	compare	the	
West	Digest	System	to	a	centrally	planned	economic	system,	which	he	contrasts	to	the	marketplace	
economy	of	the	databases.	Id.	at	55–56.
	 18.	 Berring,	Form Molds Substance,	supra	note	9,	at	15.	For	more	on	Berring’s	thoughts	on	the	influences	
of	Blackstone	and	the	Commentaries,	see	Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts,	supra	note	3,	at	307–10.
	 19.	 Id.	at	16.
	 20.	 Id.	at	16–17.
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¶8	 In	 the	 early	 and	 mid-nineteenth	 century,	 the	 volume	 of	 American	 reports	
remained	small	enough	that	practitioners	could	still	read	and	retain	what	was	necessary	
to	practice.21	“The	law	presented	an	internally	coherent	structure	containing	timeless	
truths,	in	largely	unwritten	form.	The	part	that	had	been	reduced	to	written	form	was	
manageable.”22	During	the	period	of	post-Civil	War	industrialization	and	geographic	
expansion	of	the	United	States,	however,	the	volume	of	published	case	law	increased	
dramatically,23	and	existing	mechanisms	for	publishing	decisions	in	a	timely	manner	
and	providing	access	to	them	were	no	longer	adequate,	either	for	individual	jurisdic-
tions	or	on	a	national	basis.	The	West	Company	succeeded	in	meeting	the	need	for	
better	 reporting	 and	 access	 by	 developing	 products	 notable	 for	 their	 accuracy	 and	
comprehensiveness.24	While	some	of	its	competitors	attempted	to	follow	the	English	
practice	of	selective	publication	of	court	opinions,	West’s	comprehensive	case	report-
ing	system	prevailed25	and	contributed	to	a	“gigantic	growth	in	published	cases.”26	
¶9	As	 Berring	 put	 it,	 “under	 the	 comprehensive	 model,	 the	 publication	 of	
thousands	 of	 contradictory	 and	 unenlightened	 opinions	 undercut	 the	 theoretical	
basis	of	the	common	law,”27	making	it	“not	difficult	to	show	the	inconsistences	of	
a	system	that	contained	so	many	constituent	parts.”28	West’s	comprehensive	report-
ing	of	opinions	had	helped	create	the	problem,	but	the	company’s	digest	and	key	
number	system	contributed	to	its	solution.	By	providing	a	classification	structure	
premised	on	providing	a	location	“for	every	possible	legal	issue	.	.	.	[West’s]	sub-
ject	arrangement	lent	its	structure	to	American	law.”29	For	Berring,	West’s	publi-
cations	not	only	“had	a	profound	and	continuing	impact	on	the	way	information	
about	law	was	organized	[but]	West’s	influence	may	have	saved	the	myth	of	the	
common	law	from	what	looked	like	its	inevitable	demise.”30	
	 21.	 Id.	at	19.	Berring	suggested	that	there	were	“still	only	a	few	hundred	[volumes	of	American	case	reports]	
at	the	middle	of	the	nineteenth	century.”	Id.	(citing	FRedeRiCK C. hiCKs, MateRials and Methods oF 
legal ReseaRCh with bibliogRaphiCal ManUal	111	(1923)	(Berring	cites	page	110.)).
	 22.	 Id.
	 23.	 Hicks	estimated	that	 there	were	nearly	3800	volumes	of	American	case	law	in	1885.	hiCKs,	supra	
note	21,	at	111.	
	 24.	 Berring,	Form Molds Substance,	supra	note	9,	at	21.
	 25.	 Id.
	 26.	 Id.	at	22.
	 27.	 Id.	at	23.
	 28.	 Id.	at	24.
	 29.	 Id.	at	25.
	 30.	 Id.	“No	serious	scholar	can	posit	a	belief	in	the	myth	of	Blackstone’s	common	law.	.	.	.	Yet,	the	vast	
majority	of	practitioners,	 far	 from	academic	debates,	have	continued	 to	use	a	 research	system	that	
imposes	a	structure	of	organization	derived	from	the	grand	scheme.”	Id.	at	26.	
	 	 	 But	would	it	survive	the	print	era?	As	Berring	put	it,	“[T]he	ability	to	search	without	an	imposed	
structure	will	nakedly	expose	the	myth	of	the	common	law	and	the	beauty	of	the	seamless	web	to	
the	 general	 legal	world.”	 Id.	 at	 26.	 In	 a	 1988	 talk	 to	 the	Canadian	Association	 of	Law	Libraries/
l’Association	Canadienne	des	Bibliothèques	de	Droit,	Berring	said:
	 	 As	we	go	to	a	full-text	system	.	.	.	,	it	will	no	longer	make	sense	to	even	talk	about	a	larger	majestic	
whole	to	the	law.	There	will	be	no	one	forcing	[millions	of	cases]	into	those	categories	and	with	
the	thousands	and	tens	of	thousands	and	hundreds	of	thousands	and	even	millions	of	cases	coming	
down	it	is	very	hard	to	support	the	myth	that	there	is	a	larger	structure	of	law	being	revealed	by	
the	judges.
	 	 Robert	Berring,	Full Text Legal Research: Implications for the Future,	14 Call newsl./bUll. de l’ 
aCbd 186,	189	(1989).
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Legal Information Systems
¶10	To	this	point,	Berring’s	articles	had	provided	thoughtful	histories	of	the	publica-
tion	and	organization	of	United	States	case	law	and	its	finding	tools,	while	showing	
how	 the	 initiatives	of	West	Publishing	Company	had	 responded	 to	 the	challenges	
posed	to	Blackstone’s	idea	of	the	common	law	by	the	growth	of	published	law	in	
the	late	nineteenth	century.	Yet,	Berring	had	not	said	much	about	how	the	influences	
of	West’s	digest	and	classification	systems	on	American	lawyers’	understandings	of	
the	common	law	operated	in	practice.	His	1994	article,	“Collapse	of	the	Structure	
of	the	Legal	Research	Universe:	The	Imperative	of	Digital	Information,”31	took	his	
previous	work	into	a	discussion	of	information	systems	and	also	introduced	the	idea	
of	the	conceptual	universe	of	legal	information.
¶11	Berring	 began	 by	 noting	 “the	 very	 special	way	 in	which	 legal	 thinkers	
and	legal	practitioners	have	viewed	published	legal	materials,”	the	“almost	mysti-
cal	quality”	 that	 they	hold	 for	 the	 legal	 researcher,	 and	 the	belief	 “that	 law	has	
‘primary’	sources,	that	is,	that	texts	exist	which	are	statements	of	the	law	itself.”32	
Significant	to	his	argument,	“most	of	this	primary	authority	is	found,	not	in	legisla-
tion	or	constitutions,	but	in	the	cases	that	interpret	them	or	that	indeed	run	beyond	
them.	.	.	.	[T]hese	decisions	of	the	courts	are	the	stuff	of	primary	authority.”33
¶12	This	 belief	 “that	 there	 are	 definitive,	 primary	 sources	 that	 contain	 truth	
needing	only	the	correct	 interpretation	to	be	understood	is	an	amazing	phenom-
enon	[that]	hearkens	back	to	the	age	of	Blackstone	and	his	belief	that	law	was	like	
a	science	which	lent	itself	to	analysis	in	the	same	way	that	natural	science	did.”34	
Contemporary	 legal	 theorists,	 including	 those	working	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 doctrinal	
studies,	recognized	that	“there	is	little	theoretical	possibility	for	staking	out	a	com-
mon	law	apart	from	the	judges	who	make	it	and	the	society	in	which	they	live,”	
and	that	“there	is	no	grand	scheme	in	the	common	law.”	Yet,	even	they	“continue	
to	parse	and	analyze	cases	 in	much	 the	same	manner	as	 their	 forbears.	 .	 .	 .	The	
profession’s	obsession	with	tying	cases	together	has	not	abated.”35	Coupled	with	
continued	belief	in	the	power	of	the	common	law	is	the	American	lawyer’s	need	to	
find	published	cases	directly	applicable	to	issue	at	hand,	cases	on	“all	fours”—	a	
unique	concept	in	the	world	of	information.	In	most	fields,	“there	are	no	points	of	
primary	authority.	There	are	no	nuggets	of	truth	or	treasure.	.	.	.	Legal	researchers	
believe	 that	 there	 are	 answers	 out	 there	 that	 are	 not	 just	 powerfully	 persuasive,	
but	are	the	law	itself.”36	For	Berring,	both	the	traditional	myth	and	the	search	for	
nuggets	of	authority	and	truth	continued	to	survive	because	“legal	information	was	
controlled	in	a	closed	ended	system.”37	
	 31.	 Berring,	Collapse of the Structure,	supra	note	2.
	 32.	 Id.	at	10.
	 33.	 Id.
	 34.	 Id.	at	11	(citing	daniel J. booRstin, the MysteRioUs sCienCe oF the law (1941)).	Berring	noted	
that	“[t]he	ideas	are	directly	traceable	to	Langdell	and	his	followers	as	well.”	Id.	at	n.8.
	 35.	 Id.	at	12.
	 36.	 Id.	at	14.
	 37.	 Id.	at	15.
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¶13	Like	other	information	systems,	the	information	system	of	law	has	two	parts:	a	
database	and	an	organizing	system.38	The	test	for	any	organizing	system	comes	when	the	
database	expands.	In	law,	as	the	database	of	cases	grew	in	the	nineteenth	century,	earlier	
organizing	systems	(abridgements,39	personal	notebooks,40	treatises41)	were	no	longer	up	
to	their	task.	The	West	Digest	System	was,	however;	and,	by	providing	a	sophisticated	
organizing	system	for	law,	West	“remade	the	structure	of	legal	thinking.”42	As	Berring	
described	 it,	 the	West	 system	 “is	 a	 prototype	 organizing	 system,”	 precoordinated	 to	
include	“every	possible	subject	which	could	be	the	topic	of	an	issue	of	law	that	could	be	
resolved	by	a	judge	in	an	appellate	decision.”43	New	ideas	and	theories	would	be	classi-
fied	into	existing	categories;	new	topics	would	be	added	only	when	absolutely	necessary.	
As	Berring	put	it:	“In	effect,	West	produced	.	.	.	‘a	universe	of	thinkable	thoughts.’”44
¶14	Berring	noted	that	the	idea	of	applying	a	uniform	subject	arrangement	to	all	of	
the	U.S.	states	and	to	the	federal	system	was	“marvelously	crazy,”	but	still	“the	digest	
system	prospered.”45	Why?	Berring	cited	not	only	the	power	of	the	digest	itself,	but	
how	well	 its	organizing	system	mirrored	the	late	nineteenth-century	legal	education	
curriculum	that	developed	at	Harvard	Law	School	and	spread	to	other	schools	at	the	
same	time.46	Legal	research	focused	on	finding	cases	and	the	Harvard	model	of	legal	
education	 focused	on	analyzing	 them.	 In	 time,	“the	 legal	 information	 system	 inter-
twined	itself	with	the	organization	of	the	law	itself.	.	.	.	How	one	organizes	the	law	
became	the	center	of	what	the	law	could	and	did	mean.”47	The	universe	sketched	out	by	
West	became	“the	only	universe	available.	.	.	.	Legal	research	.	.	.	was	an	artificial	world	
where	only	the	cases,	cases	arranged	and	sorted	by	West	.	.	.	,	really	mattered.”48
	 38.	 Id.	at	17.	Berring	used	the	example	of	his	son’s	baseball	card	collection	to	demonstrate	the	concept.	
Id.	at	17–19.
	 39.	 Perhaps	 the	best	discussion	of	abridgements	 is	FRedeRiCK C. hiCKs, MateRials and Methods oF 
legal ReseaRCh with bibliogRaphiC ManUal 216–33	(2d.	rev.	&	enl.	ed.	1933)	[hereinafter	hiCKs 
(1933)].
	 40.	 See	 id.	at	196–97.	For	recent	research	on	the	uses	of	commonplace	books,	see	paUl M. pRUitt & 
david i. dURhaM, CoMMonplaCe booKs oF law: a seleCtion oF law-Related notebooKs FRoM 
the seventeenth CentURy to the Mid-twentieth CentURy (2005);	M.	H.	Hoeflich,	The Lawyer 
as Pragmatic Reader: The History of Legal Common-Placing,	55	aRK. l. Rev.	87	(2002).
	 41.	 See	A.W.B.	Simpson,	The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal 
Literature,	49	U. Chi. l. Rev. 632	(1981).
	 42.	 Berring,	Collapse of the Structure,	supra	note	2,	at	20.
	 43.	 Id.	at	21.
	 44.	 Id.	Berring	credits	Dan	Dabney	(currently	Senior	Director,	Thomson	Global	Services)	with	the	first	
application	of	the	term	to	legal	information.	See	id.	at	21	n.27;	Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts, supra 
note 3,	at	311	n.13.	See also	Daniel	Dabney,	The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: Literary Warrant 
and West’s Key Number System,	99	law libR. J.	229,	229,	2007	law libR J.	14,	¶	4.	
	 45.	 Berring,	Collapse of the Structure,	supra	note	2,	at	22.							
	 46.	 The	seven	main	topics	in	the	West	digests	are	similar	to	the	basic	courses	in	the	first-year	law	school	
curriculum,	both	at	Harvard	in	the	final	quarter	of	the	nineteenth	century	and	today.	Berring	compares	
the	digest	topics	with	the	first-year	courses	at	his	own	school.	Id.	n.31.
	 47.	 Id.	at	23.
	 48.	 Id.	at	24.	 In	contrast,	 full-text	searching	breaks	down	the	universe	created	by	 the	digest	 in	several	
ways,	including	providing	ready	access	to	nonjudicial	sources:	“Materials	that	once	were	held	in	the	
sub-basements	of	only	the	best	law	libraries	are	now	as	easily	retrieved	on	Lexis	and	Westlaw	as	a	
Supreme	Court	decision.”	Id.	at	29.
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Changes in the Information Environment
¶15	Between	1995	and	1997,	Berring	published	three	articles	written	against	the	
immediate	background	of	changes	in	the	legal	information	environment	prompted	
by	 the	 increasing	 concentration	 of	 ownership	 in	 legal	 publishing.	 “On	 Not	
Throwing	Out	the	Baby:	Planning	the	Future	of	Legal	Information,”49	published	in	
1995,	is	devoted	largely	to	arguments	that	market	forces,	rather	than	government	
initiatives,	 should	determine	 the	 future	 framework	of	 the	U.S.	 legal	 information	
system.	The	article	provided	insightful	commentary	on	West’s	systems,	but	did	not	
significantly	advance	the	themes	of	his	earlier	articles.50	
¶16	 Two	 years	 later,	 “Chaos,	 Cyberspace	 and	 Tradition:	 Legal	 Information	
Transmogrified”	 focused	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 changes	 in	 the	 corporate	 structure	
and	 ownership	 of	 the	 publishers	 of	 legal	 information.51	The	 article	 emphasized	
the	centrality	of	law	books	to	the	practice	of	law	in	the	United	States,	citing	the	
importance	of	Blackstone’s	Commentaries,	the	emphasis	on	the	law	library	in	the	
Harvard	model	of	legal	education,	and	“the	substantive	and	structural	importance	
of	the	West	National	Reporter	and	Digest	System.”52	As	Berring	put	it,	“the	great	
sets	of	books	around	which	so	much	is	built	are	so	completely	a	part	of	our	legal	
tradition	that	they	disappear	before	us.	.	.	.	The	legal	publication	universe	is	at	the	
core	of	American	law.”53	Once	again	tracing	West’s	history,	Berring	emphasized	
the	 influences	of	 the	company’s	standardized	case	 reporting	and	comprehensive	
coverage	on	American	jurisprudence.	Although	West	did	not	actually	publish	all	
decisions	 issued	by	American	appellate	courts,	 it	seemed	that	 it	did.	Only	 those	
decisions	that	were	published	in	West	reporters	“conveyed	‘reality’	to	a	decision	
.	.	.	.	[O]nly	when	a	case	appeared	in	the	West	system	did	it	become	real.”54	Written	
shortly	 after	West	 was	 acquired	 by	 the	Thomson	 Publishing	Group,	 the	 article	
outlined	 issues	 for	 a	 future	 in	which	 legal	 information	would	 be	 a	 commodity,	
less	distinguishable	 (perhaps	 indistinguishable)	 from	other	 information	 supplied	
electronically	by	the	conglomerate	companies	that	now	owned	West	and	the	other	
legal	 publishers.	 In	 the	 emerging	 legal	 information	 environment,	 where	 would	
lawyers	find	the	touchstones	of	stability	and	authority	that	West’s	publication	and	
organizing	systems	had	provided?	
	 49.	 Robert	C.	Berring,	On Not Throwing Out the Baby: Planning the Future of Legal Information,	83	
Cal. l. Rev. 615	(1995)	[hereinafter	Berring,	Planning the Future].
	 50.	 It	does	include	a	suggestive	footnote	reference	to	“the	growing	literature	in	the	law	on	the	impact	that	
the	catgorization	of	information	has	upon	the	ability	of	lawyers	and	judges	to	function.”	Id.	at	616	n.	
1.
	 51.	 Robert	 C.	 Berring,	 Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal Information Transmogrified,	 12	
beRKeley teCh. l. J. 189	(1997)	[hereinafter	Berring,	Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition].	In	the	mid-
1990s,	LexisNexis,	West	Publishing,	and	the	publisher	of	Shepard’s Citations	were	each	acquired	by	
large	international	information	corporations.	Id.	at	198–99.
	 52.	 Id.	at	189.
	 53.	 Id.	at	189–90.
	 54.	 Id.	at	192–93.	“[A]t	its	apex,	the	controlled	paper	universe	of	legal	information	consisted	of	a	set	of	
West	reporters	and	a	set	of	Shepard’s Citations.”	Id.	at	195.
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¶17	In	the	short	essay	“Ring	Dang	Doo,”	published	in	the	Green Bag in	1997,	
Berring	began	with	the	statement	that	“[t]he	very	skeleton	of	the	law	is	breaking	
down.	.	.	.	[T]he	superstructure	upon	which	legal	concepts	are	arrayed	[is]	implod-
ing.”55	He	then	succinctly	described	the	impacts	of	West	Publishing	Company	on	
American	law:
Over	the	110	years	of	the	West	era,	the	West	System	became	so	embedded	in	legal	thought	
that	it	became	invisible.	We	thought	in	West	terms,	we	discussed	law	in	West	categories.	.	.	.	
Without	realizing	it,	we	all	depended	on	West	for	giving	us	ways	to	think	coherently	about	
the	hundreds	of	thousands	of	cases	that	were	stuffed	into	the	reporters.56
¶18	 In	explanation	for	 the	breakdown	of	 the	old	universe,	Berring	noted	 the	
effects	 of	 Thomson’s	 acquisition	 of	 the	West	 Publishing	 Company,57	 but	 also	
law	students’	and	young	 lawyers’	growing	reliance	on	computer-based	research.	
“[T]here	 is	now	 ten	years	worth	of	 law	students	who	have	graduated	with	 little	
knowledge	of	the	[West]	Topics	and	Key	Numbers	as	part	of	their	universe.	 .	 .	 .	
The	new	researcher	does	not	 think	 in	subject	categories	with	sharply	delineated	
subdivisions	like	those	in	the	Key	Number	system.”58	Though	brief,	the	Green Bag 
essay	provided	an	appropriate	coda	for	the	first	and	middle	periods	of	Berring’s	
writings	on	legal	information	and	set	the	stage	for	the	later	articles.
Summing Up
¶19	Published	in	2000,	“Legal	Research	and	the	World	of	Thinkable	Thoughts”	is	
perhaps	Berring’s	most	 thorough	elaboration	of	his	 ideas	 regarding	 the	place	of	
West’s	 digest	 system	 in	 the	 conceptual	 universe	 that	 dominated	American	 legal	
thinking	until	“[t]echnology	.	.	.	invaded	the	world	of	legal	information.”59	Relying	
on	Geoffrey	Bowker	and	Susan	Star’s	recent	book	on	the	effects	of	classification,	
Berring	 explained	 how	 decisions	 on	 classifying	 and	 categorizing	 information	
affect	the	thinking	of	those	using	an	information	system.60	Classification	decisions	
initially	made	simply	to	construct	“a	workable	sorting	process	transform	the	very	
process.”	Over	time,	these	early	decisions	can	come	to	be	accepted	as	“the	only	
possible	outcome[s],	the	result	appears	to	be	natural.	.	.	.	Because	those	who	use	
the	system	tend	to	conceptualize	in	terms	of	the	system	and,	as	a	system	matures,	it	
becomes	authoritative,	the	classification	system	simply	describes	the	universe.”61	
¶20	 In	 law,	 what	 Berring	 called	 the	 “confluence”	 of	 the	 structure	 pre-
sented	 by	 Blackstone	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 the	 curriculum	 of	 modern	 legal	
	 55.	 Robert	C.	Berring,	Ring Dang Doo,	1	gReen bag 2d	3,	3	(1997)	[hereinafter	Berring,	Ring Dang 
Doo].
	 56.	 Id.	at	3–4.
	 57.	 Id.	at	3–5.
	 58.	 Id.	at	5.
	 59.	 Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts,	supra	note	3,	at	311.
	 60.	 Id.	 at	 310	 n.11	 (citing	 geoFFRey C. bowKeR & sUsan leigh staR, soRting things oUt: 
ClassiFiCation and its ConseqUenCes (1999)	 for	 its	 discussion	of	 “determinative	 power	 of	 clas-
sification	systems”).	
	 61.	 Id.	at	310.
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education	that	developed	in	the	last	quarter	of	the	nineteenth	century	at	Harvard,	and	
the	West	Digest	System	all	contributed	to	what	came	to	be	seen	as	an	inevitable	way	
to	classify	legal	concepts.	The	conceptual	universe	“present[ed]	itself	as	the	law.”62	
Because	American	lawyers	sought	the	information	they	required	through	the	digest	
system,	they	came	to	think	about	the	law	through	the	concepts	embodied	in	it.	
¶21	By	2000,	new	students	entered	law	school	already	“fully	conversant	with	
modern	search	engines	and	interfaces”	and	no	longer	interested	in	looking	to	the	
established	organizational	structures	of	the	law	to	enter	the	universe	of	thinkable	
thoughts.	 “Rather	 than	 having	 legal	 information	 shape	 their	 perceptions	 of	 the	
world,	 they	are	shaping	 legal	 information	 to	 their	existing	 information	world.”63	
As	a	result,	“the	old	classification	system	of	West	topic	and	key	numbers	.	.	.	no	
longer	 define	 the	 reality	 of	 legal	 thinking.”64	 In	 addition,	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	
legal	information	universe	were	shifting,	both	through	the	habits	of	a	new	genera-
tion	of	 legal	 researchers	accustomed	 to	using	electronic	search	 tools	 throughout	
their	 professional	 (and	 personal)	 lives,	 and	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 ownership	 of	
companies	that	published	legal	information.	The	intrusion	into	the	legal	informa-
tion	market	of	large	multinational	companies	with	wide-ranging	subject	interests	
meant	that	“[w]hat	once	was	a bright-line border between	legal	information	and	
‘other’	 sources	 is	 fading	as	 integrated	 information	providers	offer	 sources	of	all	
sorts	through	legal	portals.”65	
¶22	The	article	concluded	with	calls	for	a	new	Blackstone,	for	someone	who	
could	“reconceptualize	the	structure	of	legal	information”	and	develop	a	new	set	
of	thinkable	thoughts	for	the	twenty-first	century.66
¶23	The	 series	of	 articles	 culminated	 in	 the	California Law Review	 in	2000	
with	“Legal	 Information	and	 the	Search	for	Cognitive	Authority,”	a	 rich	discus-
sion	of	legal	information	at	the	beginning	of	the	twenty-first	century	that	amplifies	
many	themes	from	Berring’s	previous	work.	Here,	Berring	continued	to	explore	
the	changing	boundaries	of	the	legal	information	universe,	using	the	idea	of	cogni-
tive	(or	“trusted”)	authorities	to	analyze	the	present	condition	of	legal	information	
and	 legal	 authority.67	 Throughout	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 legal	 information	 was	
	 62.	 Id.	at	311.	In	effect,	 it	established	the	terms	of	professional	discourse	within	the	legal	community.	
Berring	did	not	employ	 the	concepts	of	community	or	professional	discourse	here	or	elsewhere	 in	
the	series	of	articles,	although	he	alluded	to	discourse	in	the	first	article	in	the	series.	Berring,	Full-
Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	54	(“The	Digest	was	the	internal,	mediating	structure	within	the	old	
modes	of	discourse.	The	West	editors	were,	in	effect,	the	Platonic	Guardians	of	legal	language	and	
legal	meanings.	The	discourse,	in	turn,	was	the	ground	of	integration	and	coherence	in	substantive	
law.”).
	 63.	 Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts,	supra	note	3,	at	313.
	 64.	 Id.	at	314.
	 65.	 Id.	at	311	(emphasis	added).	Berring	pointed	out	that	this	was	not	simply	a	matter	of	the	differences	
between	print	and	online	 information	seeking.	The	challenges	 to	 the	boundaries	of	 the	universe	of	
thinkable	thoughts	came	rather	when	the	same	tools	could	be	used	to	locate	nonlegal	as	well	as	legal	
information.	The	first	legal	databases,	Westlaw	and	Lexis,	were	products	aimed	specifically	at	law-
yers:	“they	worked	within	the	existing	universe	of	thinkable	thoughts.”	Id.	at	312.
	 66.	 Id.	at	315–16.	“The	time	is	now,	the	stakes	are	enormous,	Blackstone,	come	home.”	Id.	at	318.
	 67.	 Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	supra	note	1,	at	1676.
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characterized	by	“a	deeply	 rooted	 and	 stable	 array	of	 cognitive	 authorities.	 .	 .	 .	
[C]ertain	sets	of	books	were	authoritative	and	reliable.”68	The	cognitive	authorities	
included	the	primary	sources	of	law:	judicial	reports	(embodied	by	West’s	National	
Reporter	System);	statutes	and	administrative	rules;	Shepard’s Citations;	and	the	
American	Digest	System,	which,	in	a	case-based	system,	“set	the	cornerstones	of	
cognitive	authority	in	place.”69	
¶24	Over	the	course	of	the	twentieth	century,	however,	the	mix	of	authorities	
changed	both	in	the	relative	importance	of	the	recognized	sources	and	through	the	
introduction	of	new	sources,	something	Berring	demonstrated	by	comparing	the	
sources	cited	 in	an	1899	volume	of	United States Reports and	 those	 in	a	single	
U.S.	Supreme	Court	opinion	published	in	1999	in	U.S. Law Week.70	After	noting	
that	 the	 range	 of	 subjects	 addressed	 in	 each	 year	 is	 similar	 enough	 to	 support	
comparison	of	what	source	materials	are	cited,	Berring	found	that	the	1899	Court	
cited	to	judicial	reports	(predominately),	to	legislation,	and	in	a	few	instances	to	
secondary	 sources.71	 There	 were	 apparently	 no	 citations	 to	 nonlegal	 secondary	
sources.	Berring	offered	three	possible	explanations	for	the	mix.	The	first	is	that	in	
1899	there	were	few	sources	other	than	judicial	opinions	or	statutes	available	for	
lawyers	and	judges	to	cite	as	authority.72	A	second	explanation	is	the	continuing	
strength	of	the	“myth	of	the	common	law”	in	American	legal	thinking	at	the	end	of	
the	nineteenth	century.73	The	third	is	that	it	would	still	be	nine	years	before	heavy	
citation	of	nonlegal	sources	(e.g.,	social	science	materials	and	statistics)	became	
acceptable,	if	not	common	immediately,	after	the	brief	filed	on	behalf	of	the	state	
of	Oregon	by	Louis	Brandeis	in	Muller v. Oregon.74	
	 68.	 Id.	at	1676–77.	“One	didn’t	need	to	look	behind	such	a	publication	and	evaluate	its	worth.	The	process	
of	critically	judging	its	value	had	been	performed	long	ago.”	Id.	at	1677.
	 69.	 Id.	at	1680.
	 70.	 Id.	 at	 1683–91.	 Studies	 of	 sources	 cited	 in	 judicial	 opinions,	 especially	 the	 opinions	 of	 the	 U.S.	
Supreme	Court,	are	fairly	common	in	the	legal	research	literature,	particularly	since	the	availability	
of	full-text	searching	in	the	legal	databases. See sources	cited infra	note	178.
	 71.	 Id.	at	1686–87.	
	 72.	 This	explanation	is	a	demonstration	of	what	Karl	Llewellyn	called	“the	threat	of	the	available,”	which	
he	defined	as	“the	almost	inevitable	tendency	in	any	thinking,	or	in	any	study,	first	to	turn	to	the	most	
available	material	and	to	study	that—to	study	it	exclusively—at	the	outset;	second,	having	once	begun	
the	study	of	the	available,	to	lose	all	perspective	and	come	shortly	to	mistake	the	merely	available,	the	
easily	seen,	for	all	there	is	to	see.”	Karl	N.	Llewellyn,	Legal Tradition and Social Science Method—A 
Realist’s Critique,	 in	essays on ReseaRCh in the soCial sCienCes 89,	95–96	(1931),	reprinted in 
KaRl n. llewellyn, JURispRUdenCe: RealisM in theoRy and pRaCtiCe 77,	82	(1962).	Berring	does	
not	discuss	Llewellyn.
	 	 	 For	an	argument	that	the	increased	availability	and	distribution	of	congressional	documents	was	one	
reason	for	the	increased	citation	by	U.S.	courts	of	legislative	history	materials	in	the	interpretation	of	
statutes	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	see	Richard	A.	Danner,	Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical 
and Comparative Perspectives on the Availability of Legislative History,	dUKe J. CoMp. & int’l l.,	
Summer	2003,	at	151.
	 73.	 Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	supra	note	1,	at	1687	(“The	myth	of	the	common	law	as	a	beautifully	
constructed,	logically	consistent,	ptolemaic	system	of	unwritten	law	was	still	strong.”).
	 74.	 Id.	 at	 1688	 (citing	Muller	 v.	Oregon,	 208	U.S.	 412	 (1908)).	 For	 discussion	 of	 the	 impacts	 of	 the	
Brandeis	brief,	see	John w. Johnson, aMeRiCan legal CUltURe, 1908–1940,	at	29–51	(1981).	
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¶25	In	contrast	 to	 the	limited	variety	of	sources	cited	in	the	1899	volume	of	
U.S. Reports,	Berring	found	“a	wonderland	of	sources	beyond	the	bounds	of	cases	
and	statutes”	cited	in	the	Supreme	Court’s	opinion	in	Alden v. Maine,	decided	in	
June	1999.75	In	the	majority	and	dissenting	opinions,	Berring	located	citations	not	
only	to	“hundreds	of	cases,”	but	to	the	Federalist	Papers,	legal	treatises,	law	journal	
articles,	and	works	by	historians	and	English	commentators.76	He	concluded	that	
for	the	modern	Supreme	Court,	“there	is	no	final	primary	authority,	only	a	kaleido-
scope	of	sources.”77	As	a	result,	“[t]he	nature	of	legal	authority	used	by	the	United	
States	Supreme	Court	has	changed.	.	.	.	The	stability	of	1899	is	gone.”78
¶26	In	addition	to	analyzing	the	changing	boundaries	of	the	universe	of	legal	
information,	Berring	returned	in	“Cognitive	Authority”	to	his	earlier	discussion	of	
legal	information	systems.79	As	in	1994,	he	defined	an	information	system	in	terms	
of	both	a	database	of	information	and	an	organizing	system	designed	to	facilitate	
retrieval	of	what	is	needed	from	the	database.80	In	law,	during	the	twentieth	cen-
tury,	 the	database	for	 legal	 information	had	been	 the	National	Reporter	System.	
Although	some	courts	continued	to	publish	opinions	in	“official”	reporters	in	addi-
tion	to	the	West	versions,	“in	practice,	one	who	wanted	to	carry	out	research	ended	
up	relying	on	the	West	National	Reporter	System.”81	
¶27	 The	 organizing	 system	 for	 the	 database	 of	 published	 cases	 was	 the	
American	 Digest	 System,	 “a	 precoordinated	 index	 that	 covered	 every	 possible	
legal	situation.	.	.	.	The	Digest	System	organized	each	case	that	passed	through	the	
National	Reporter	System	into	a	predetermined	set	of	categories.	.	.	.	Generations	
of	 lawyers	 learned	 to	 conceptualize	 legal	 problems	 using	 the	 categories	 of	 the	
Topics	and	Key	Numbers	of	the	American	Digest	System.”82	Over	time,	the	system	
“became	staggeringly	complex”	and	difficult	for	lawyers	to	use	and	understand,	but	
“[t]he	beautiful	part	was	that	they	did	not	have	to	fully	understand	how	it	worked	
.	.	.	.	The	categories	established	by	the	Digest	system	were	deeply	ingrained.”83
	 75.	 Id.	at	1689	(citing	Alden	v.	Maine,	527	U.S.	706	(1999)	(Berring	references	the	case	to	its	locations	in	
United States Law Week (67	U.S.L.W.	4601)	and	the	Supreme Court Reporter (119	S.	Ct.	2240).).	
	 76.	 Id.	at	1689–90.	The	number	of	footnotes	in	the	opinion	is	itself	instructive:	in	Alden,	Justice	Souter’s	
dissent	alone	has	forty-three	footnotes,	while	there	are	only	six	footnotes	in	the	full	volume	of	opin-
ions	from	1899.	Id.	at	1690.
	 77.	 Id.	at	1690.
	 78.	 Id.	at	1691	(citing	Frederick	Schauer	&	Virginia	J.	Wise,	Legal Positivism as Legal Information,	82	
CoRnell l. Rev. 1080	 (1997)	 [hereinafter	Schauer	&	Wise,	Legal Positivism];	Frederick	Schauer	
&	Virginia	 J.	Wise,	Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law,	 29	 J. legal stUd. 495	
(2000)	[hereinafter	Schauer	&	Wise,	Nonlegal Information]).	For	discussion	of	the	Schauer	and	Wise	
articles,	see	infra	notes	171–78	and	accompanying	text.
	 79.	 See	Berring,	Collapse of the Structure,	supra	note	2,	at	16–23.
	 80.	 Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	supra	note	1,	at	1691.
	 81.	 Id.	at	1692.	Berring	noted	that	even	the	publishers	of	other	sets	waited	until	the	West	version	of	a	case	
appeared	before	including	it	in	their	products.	Id.
	 82.	 Id.	at	1693.	“Since	the	seven	main	divisions	of	the	Topic	breakdown	track	the	first-year	courses	at	
most	law	schools,	the	power	of	the	scheme	cuts	even	deeper.” Id.
	 83.	 Id.	at	1694.	As	part	of	this	discussion,	Berring	pointed	out	that	“[t]he	average	practitioner	learned	to	
work	with	parts	of	the	system.	She	discovered	how	to	use	the	available	Key	Number	tags	in	a	rudi-
mentary	way,	and	it	was	fine.”	Id.
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¶28	The	database	in	Berring’s	legal	information	system	included	only	case	law	
and	the	organizing	system	provided	access	only	to	cases.	Berring	acknowledged	
that	 this	might	seem	to	give	“short	shrift”	 to	other	sources	of	authority,	such	as	
statutes	and	administrative	law.	But,	he	explained	that	“American	law	has	always	
been	about	cases,”84	and	that	statutory	and	administrative	law	have	only	recently	
become	important	sources	of	law.85	Thus,	prior	to	the	last	quarter	of	the	twentieth	
century,	the	universe	of	legal	information	was	stable.	There	was	an	accepted	data-
base	of	information,	a	powerful	organizing	system,	and	even	a	method	[Shepard’s 
Citations]	for	verifying	information.”86
¶29	The	rest	of	 the	article	describes	what	had	happened	during	 the	previous	
twenty-five	years	to	“mortally	wound”	this	stable	universe.	As	in	earlier	articles,	
Berring	noted	that	in	itself	the	change	from	reliance	on	print	to	electronic	sources	
for	 legal	 research	 was	 not	 the	 cause—initially	 at	 least	 Lexis	 and	Westlaw	 had	
“aped	the	functions	of	the	old	system.”87	Instead,	he	focused	on	three	other	factors:	
a	new	environment	in	which	users	of	legal	information	had	always	worked	with	
electronic	 information	 sources;	 the	 consolidation	 of	 legal	 publishers	 into	 large	
corporate	entities	 that	viewed	 legal	 information	as	a	commodity	similar	 to	 their	
other	 information	products;	and	 the	 Internet,	which	would	destroy	 the	cognitive	
authority	of	the	National	Reporter	System.88	
¶30	The	 article	 and	 the	 series	 closed	with	what	 Berring	 called	 a	 “sermon,”	
summarizing	the	deleterious	effects	of	the	breakdown	of	the	one-hundred-year-old	
universe	 of	 legal	 information,89	 and	 looking	 hopefully	 to	 “the	 younger	 genera-
tion	to	man	the	ramparts	of	cognitive	authority”	and	demand	that	the	information	
	 84.	 Id.	at	1693.
	 85.	 Id.	at	1694	(“For	most	of	the	twentieth	century	[statutes]	were	second-class.”).	Earlier	in	this	article	
and	elsewhere	in	the	series,	Berring	seemed	to	downplay	the	importance	of	legislation	prior	to	the	
late	twentieth	century.	See	id.	at	1686	(“I	was	interested	to	find	that	even	this	early	[in	1899],	legisla-
tion	was	a	topic.	Several	of	the	cases	focus	on	statutes.”);	Berring,	Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition,	
supra	 note	 51,	 at	 192	n.9	 (“Only	 in	 recent	 years	 have	 statutes	 and	 administrative	 codes	grown	 in	
influence.”).	
	 	 	 William	Popkin	has	argued,	however,	that	legislation	was	an	important	source	of	law	in	the	states	
throughout	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 and	 that	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 legislation	 at	 the	 national	
level	in	the	last	quarter	of	the	century	was	indicated	by	events	such	as	the	first	codification	of	federal	
law,	the	Revised Statutes of the United States (published	in	1874),	and	the	first	official	publication	
of	congressional	debates	in	the	Congressional Record in	1873.	See	williaM d. popKin, statUtes in 
CoURt 60–61	(1999).	Others	have	pointed	out	the	growth	in	legislative	activity	during	the	last	quarter	
of	the	nineteenth	century.	See, e.g.,	gRant gilMoRe, the ages oF aMeRiCan law 63	(1977)	(noting	
that	in	the	post-Civil	War	period	“[t]he	legislatures,	stirred	by	populist	discontents,	experimented	with	
social	legislation—regulating	the	hours	and	conditions	of	employment,	restricting	the	exploitation	of	
women	and	children,	and	so	on.”); JaMes willaRd hURst, law and soCial oRdeR in the United 
states 36	 (1977)	 (“From	 the	1880’s,	 but	most	markedly	 from	 the	 take-off	 decade	of	 1905–1915,	
the	 regulatory	component	of	statute	 law	became	much	more	prominent	and	added	considerably	 to	
the	volume	of	legislation.	.	.	.”).	See generally	JaMes willaRd hURst, law and the Conditions oF 
FReedoM in the nineteenth CentURy United states 71–108	(1956).
	 86.	 Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	supra	note	1,	at	1695–96.
	 87.	 Id.	at	1696.
	 88.	 Id.	at	1696–1703.
	 89.	 Id.	at	1703–08.
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marketplace	deliver	 legal	 information	 enhanced	with	 the	value	 added	under	 the	
old	regime.90	
Other Writers
¶31	Berring’s	first	major	writings	on	 the	role	of	 legal	 information	appeared	as	a	
few	other	writers	were	also	beginning	to	consider	the	issues	raised	for	the	devel-
opment	 and	 practice	 of	 the	 law	 by	 new	 information	 technologies.	 For	most	 of	
the	 twentieth	century,	 the	 literature	of	 legal	 information91	had	dealt	mostly	with	
legal	research	and	bibliography—how	to	find	the	law	and	how	to	teach	law	stu-
dents	how	to	 find	 the	 law	(what	should	be	 taught,	how	it	 should	be	 taught,	and	
by	whom).92	In	the	1960s,	the	continuing	growth	in	the	amount	of	published	legal	
information	prompted	what	Bernard	Hibbits	called	“an	eclectic	variety	of	lawyers,	
legal	 academics,	 and	 law	 librarians	 [to	 look]	 to	 emerging	 computer	 technology	
to	facilitate	the	storage,	accessing,	and	distribution	of	legal	information.”93	A	lit-
	 90.	 Id.	at	1708.
	 91.	 The	term	“legal	information”	was	itself	seldom	used.	The	author’s	search	of	the	files	for Law Library 
Journal	 in	the	HeinOnline	database	suggests	that	the	term	appeared	in	forty	articles	between	1908	
and	1985,	but	in	thirty-five	articles	between	1986	and	2005. See generally	neil postMan, bUilding 
a bRidge to the eighteenth CentURy: how the past Can iMpRove oUR FUtURe	82–98	(1999)	for	
explorations	of	how	recently	it	is	that	we	have	started	thinking	about	“information”	as	a	concept,	as	
something	that	could	be	thought	about	apart	from	its	substantive	context.	
	 92.	 The	 legal	 research	 and	 bibliography	 literature	 began	 with	 the	 works	 of	 law	 book	 salesmen	 and	
a	 few	 law	 librarians	 at	 the	 turn	of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 and	extends	 through	 the	 era	of	 the	great	
legal	research	textbooks	to	the	present	time.	For	a	thorough	and	insightful	bibliographic	history	of	
American	legal	research	texts,	see	Steven	M.	Barkan,	On Describing Legal Research,	80	MiCh. l. 
Rev. 925	 (1982)	 [hereinafter	Barkan,	On Describing Legal Research].	For	a	brief	history	of	 legal	
research	instruction,	see	Joyce	Manna	Janto	&	Lucinda	D.	Harrison-Cox,	Teaching Legal Research: 
Past and Present,	84	law libR. J.	281,	282–89	(1992).	For	more	recent	literature,	see	generally Law 
Library Journal	 (1908–),	Legal Reference Services Quarterly	 (1981–),	and	Perspectives: Teaching 
Legal Research and Writing	(1992–).	Most	issues	of	Perspectives	also	list	recent	books	and	articles	
on	research	and	writing.
	 	 	 Berring	 himself	 has	 been	 a	 frequent	 writer,	 commentator,	 and	 innovator	 on	 matters	 of	 legal	
research	instruction.	See e.g.,	Robert	C.	Berring	&	Kathleen	Vanden	Heuvel,	Legal Research: Should 
Students Learn It or Wing It?	81	law libR. J.	431	(1989);	Robert	C.	Berring	&	Kathleen	Vanden	
Heuvel,	Legal Research: A Final Response,	82	law libR. J.	495	(1990);	Robert	C.	Berring,	A Sort 
of Response: Brutal Non-Choices,	4	peRspeCtives: teaChing legal Res. & wRiting 81	(1996).	For	
commentary	on	these	works	within	the	the	context	of	the	pedagogical	debates	of	their	time,	see	Paul	
Douglas	Callister,	Beyond Training: Law Librarianship’s Quest for the Pedagogy of Legal Research 
Education,	95	law libR. J.	7,	9–22,	2003	law libR. J.	1,	¶¶	5–35.	For	a	general	bibliography	on	
Berring’s	writings,	 including	 those	 on	 legal	 research	 instruction,	 see	 Frank	G.	Houdek,	From the 
Reference Desk to River City: A Bibliography of the Writings of Robert C. Berring,	99	law libR. J. 
413,	2007	law libR. J.	24. 
	 93.	 Bernard	J. Hibbitts,	Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace,	71	n.y.U. 
l. Rev.	615,	655	(1996).	For	useful	background	on	these	early	efforts,	see id.	at	654–57;	Jon	Bing,	
Performance of Legal Text Retrieval Systems: The Curse of Boole,	 79	law libR. J.	 187,	 187–89	
(1987);	Samuel	E.	Trosow,	The Database and the Fields of Law: Are There New Divisions of Labor?	
96	law libR. J.	63,	66–69,	2004	law libR. J.	5,	¶¶	13–18.	For	an	early	review	of	the	uses	of	comput-
ers	in	legal	research,	see	William	B.	Eldridge	&	Sally	F.	Dennis,	The Computer As a Tool for Legal 
Research,	28	law & ConteMp. pRobs. 78	(1963).
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erature	on	computer-assisted	legal	research	(CALR)	tools	began	to	develop	after	
the	widespread	 introduction	of	Lexis	 and	Westlaw	 in	 the	mid-1970s.94	 Initially,	
much	of	that	literature	described	the	benefits	and	shortcomings	of	the	new	CALR	
systems	 as	 research	 tools.95	 From	 the	mid-1980s	 on,	 however,	 the	 literature	 of	
legal	research	and	legal	 information	began	to	shift	away	from	these	initial	 takes	
on	CALR	and	 from	 the	 traditional	 concerns	with	 legal	 research	 instruction96	 to	
consider	the	broader	implications	of	the	changes	in	formats	and	structures	of	legal	
information,	and	to	awaken	the	interest	of	authors	other	than	law	librarians	and	law	
school	legal	writing	instructors.	The	rest	of	this	section	looks	at	some	of	the	more	
significant	literature	regarding	the	influences	of	legal	information	in	American	law	
and	the	connections	between	those	works	and	Berring’s	writings.	
Media and Culture
¶32	The	change	in	the	literature	was	signaled	with	the	publication	of	Ethan	Katsh’s	
“Communications	Revolutions	 and	Legal	Revolutions:	The	New	Media	 and	 the	
Future	of	Law”	in	the	Nova Law Journal in	1984.97	Following	Marshall	McLuhan,	
Harold	Innis,	and	others,	Katsh’s	article	introduced	to	legal	scholarship	the	idea	
that	the	forms	in	which	information	is	communicated	can	have	as	much	influence	
on	values	and	institutions	as	the	substantive	content	of	the	information.	Katsh	noted	
that	“legal	literature	reveals	very	little	understanding	of	the	powerful	influence	that	
the	invention	of	printing	exerted	upon	law	and	a	high	level	of	unawareness	of	how	
the	new	media	are	likely	to	lead	to	change.”98	After	discussing	how	print	had	influ-
enced	the	development	of	legal	doctrine	in	areas	such	as	copyright	and	censorship,	
	 94.	 Although	it	focuses	mainly	on	the	early	development	of	Lexis,	the	standard	history	of	the	early	years	
of	 commercially	 available	CALR	 systems	 in	 the	United	 States	 is	William	G.	Harrington,	A Brief 
History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research,	77	law libR. J. 543	(1984–85).	The	literature	about	
the	uses	of	computers	for	legal	research	is	well	tracked	in	bibliographies	published	(usually	annually)	
in	the	Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal	(1970–)	(title	varies).
	 95.	 See, e.g.,	Robert	C.	Berring,	Terminal Awareness,	Cal. law.,	Nov.	1985	at	15;	Scott	F.	Burson,	Report 
from the Electronic Trenches: An Update on Computer-Assisted Legal Research,	legal ReFeRenCe 
seRviCes q.,	Summer	1984,	at	3;	William	G.	Harrington,	H.	Donald	Wilson	&	Robert	L.	Bennett,	
The Mead Data Central System of Computerized Legal Research,	64	law libR. J. 184	(1971);	Online 
Information Retrieval for the Legal Profession: A Panel,	70	law libR. J. 532	(1977);	John	T.	Soma	&	
Andrea	R.	Stern, A Survey of Computerized Information for Lawyers: LEXIS, JURIS, WESTLAW and 
FLITE,	9	RUtgeRs CoMpUteR & teCh. l.J. 295	(1983);	James	A.	Sprowl,	Computer-Assisted Legal 
Research—An Analysis of Full-Text Document Retrieval Systems, Particularly the LEXIS System,	
1976	aM. b. FoUnd. Res. J.	175;	James	A.	Sprowl,	The WESTLAW System—A Different Approach to 
Computer-Assisted Legal Research,	16	JURiMetRiCs J.	142	(1976).
	 96.	 Writing	on	legal	research	instruction	did	not	stop,	but	there	was	perhaps	greater	focus	on	the	effects	
of	access	to	computer-assisted	legal	research	systems	on	students’	and	new	associates’	research	skills.	
See, e.g.,	Donald	J.	Dunn,	Why Legal Research Skills Declined, or When Two Rights Make a Wrong,	
85	law libR. J. 49	(1993);	 Joan	S.	Howland	&	Nancy	J.	Lewis,	The Effectiveness of Law School 
Legal Research Training Programs,	40	J. legal edUC. 381	(1990).
	 97.	 M.	Ethan	Katsh,	Communications Revolutions and Legal Revolutions: The New Media and the Future 
of Law,	8	nova l. J. 631	(1984).
	 98.	 Id.	at	638.	Katsh	noted,	however,	that	“[l]aw	librarians	seem	much	more	sensitive	than	legal	historians	
to	the	influences	of	printing	on	law.”	Id.	at	638	n.23.
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Katsh	pointed	out	that	“[t]he	first	printing	of	law	books	began	a	process	that	was	
to	make	the	printed	law	book	a	central	feature	in	the	modern	paradigm	of	law.”99	
In	addition,	Katsh	noted	the	impacts	of	the	print	medium	on	the	organization	and	
accessibility	of	the	law.100	In	discussing	the	role	of	digests	in	making	manageable	
the	 problems	of	 seeking	 precedent	 posed	 by	 the	 late	 nineteenth-century	 growth	
in	numbers	of	 reported	decisions,	Katsh	pointed	out	 that	“[t]he	digests	not	only	
provided	a	solution	to	this	problem	but	probably	also	subtly	shaped	the	attitudes	of	
generations	of	lawyers	and	law	students	about	the	degree	of	order	and	orderliness	
that	existed	in	the	legal	system,”101	thus	striking	a	theme	that	would	be	developed	
by	Berring	in	his	writings	about	the	conceptual	universe.	
¶33	While	acknowledging	that	the	full	effects	of	lawyers’	growing	reliance	on	
electronic	media	were	not	yet	clear,	Katsh	posited:
Where	there	are	too	many	prior	cases	in	an	area	and	where	cases	are	added	to	the	data	base	
much	more	quickly	than	in	the	past,	unpredictability	and	instability	will	be	the	result.	This	
will	pose	a	challenge	to	the	idea	of	precedent	and	to	the	foundation	of	the	common	law.	
Whereas	print	fostered	the	development	of	the	idea	of	precedent,	the	use	of	computers	may	
signal	the	erosion	of	this	model	of	law.102
It	 could	 be	 seen	 already	 in	 1984	 that	 the	 growth	 in	 importance	 of	 Lexis	 and	
Westlaw	for	legal	research	was	resulting	in	more	cases	being	added	to	the	available	
databases,	and	that	cases	were	becoming	available	more	quickly	than	in	the	past,	
thus	creating	greater	pressure	to	rely	on	new	cases.	In	addition,	Katsh	foresaw	that	
“computerization	of	 law	materials	will	 probably	broaden	 the	 range	of	materials	
users	will	come	in	contact	with.”103	Not	only	would	statutes	and	regulatory	materi-
als	rise	in	importance,	but	nonlaw	information	sources	would	be	as	readily	acces-
sible	to	legal	researchers	as	the	traditional	sources	found	in	the	law	library.	Again,	
Katsh	anticipated	a	theme	that	would	be	developed	by	Berring	and	by	others.
¶34	Katsh	continued	to	develop	his	own	ideas	about	 the	impacts	of	commu-
nications	media	on	the	law	in	several	other	articles104	and	two	books.105	His	later	
	 99.	 Id.	at	644.
	 100.	 Id.	at	645–46	(citing	Howard	Jay	Graham	&	John	W.	Heckel,	The Book that ‘Made’ the Common 
Law: The First Printing of Fitzherbert’s La	Graunde	Abridgement, 1514–1556,	51	law libR. J. 100,	
101	(1958)).	The	influence	of	printing	on	thought	and	behavior	is	seen	“not	only	in	the	appearance	of	
the	page,	but	in	the	organization	of	books.	Printers	were	much	more	involved	in	indexing,	cataloguing	
and	cross-referencing	works	than	were	scribes.	.	.	.”	Id.	at	650.	Katsh	also	discussed	the	relationships	
between	printing	and	Roberto	Unger’s	ideas	of	the	“legal	order”	and	law’s	autonomy.	Id.	at	654	(“[I]t	
is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 emergence	of	 the	 ‘legal	order’	paralleled	 the	development	 and	 spread	of	
printing.”).
	 101.	 Id.	at	658	n.91.
	 102.	 Id.	at	658–59.
	 103.	 Id.	at	660.
	 104.	 Ethan	Katsh,	Digital Lawyers: Orienting the Legal Profession to Cyberspace,	55	U. pitt. l. Rev. 
1141	(1994);	Ethan	Katsh,	Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace,	38	vill. l. 
Rev.	403	(1993)	[hereinafter	Katsh,	Digital World];	Ethan	Katsh,	The Law Librarian as Paratrooper,	
83	law libR. J. 627	(1991).
	 105.	 M. ethan Katsh, the eleCtRoniC Media and the tRansFoRMation oF law	 (1989)	 [hereinafter	
Katsh, eleCtRoniC Media];	M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital woRld (1995)	[hereinafter	Katsh, 
law in a digital woRld].
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work	acknowledged	Berring’s	concerns	with	the	impacts	of	the	organization	and	
classification	of	print	legal	materials	on	how	lawyers	conduct	legal	research	and	
think	about	the	law,	and	cited	Berring	for	noting	that	the	digest	system	“establishes	
a	framework	for	understanding	law	that	is	reinforced	as	one	moves	from	one	step	
of	the	process	to	the	next.”106	In	database	research,	“[m]ultiple	sources	of	informa-
tion	merge	into	one	source;	one	does	not	even	feel	that	one	is	consulting	multiple	
sources.”107	In	the	law	library,
[w]ith	space	no	longer	a	constraint,	the	lack	of	access	to	non-law	materials	that	are	part	of	
the	same	collection	becomes	harder	to	justify.	Eventually,	 it	will	be	understood	that	one	
connected	to	cyberspace	is	no	longer	really	in	a	law	library	but	in	an	environment	that	can	
be	organized	by	the	user	to	fit	his	or	her	needs.108
In	an	electronic	environment,	 the	researcher	will	no	longer	need	to	have	knowl-
edge	of	“legal	categories,	indexes,	digests	or	key	numbers.”109	
¶35	Katsh’s	thoughts	about	how	these	and	other	impacts	of	the	changing	media	
of	the	law	would	affect	the	work	of	lawyers	and	the	practice	of	law	spawned	exten-
sive	commentary	and	response.110	Among	these	works,	Nazareth	Pantaloni’s	1994	
article	was	particularly	valuable,	not	only	for	its	general	cautions	against	assuming	
too	much	about	the	direct	causal	effects	of	new	communications	technologies,111	
but	also	for	its	challenges	to	the	growing	consensus	regarding	the	role	of	indexes	
and	digests	in	the	development	of	the	law.	After	citing	Katsh	and	Berring	for	their	
comments	on	the	influences	of	the	West	digests	on	the	law	and	speculations	about	
the	impacts	of	free-text	searching,	Pantaloni	looked	at	the	historical	role	of	indexes	
	 106.	 Katsh,	Digital World,	supra	note	104,	at	460.
	 107.	 Id.	at	465.
	 108.	 Id.	at	466.
	 109.	 Id.	at	475.
	 110.	 See e.g.,	 Barkan,	 supra	 note	 1;	 Morris	 L.	 Cohen,	 Research in a Changing World of Law and 
Technology, 13 dalhoUsie l. J. 5,	 8–9,	 18 (1990);	 Bruce	A.	Markell, Digital Demons and Lost 
Lawyers,	48	Fed. CoMM. l. J. 545	(1996)	(reviewing	M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital woRld 
(1995));	Nazareth	A.	M.	Pantaloni,	III,	Legal Databases, Legal Epistemology, and the Legal Order,	
86	 law libR. J. 679	 (1994);	 Richard	 J.	 Ross,	 Communications Revolutions and Legal Culture: 
An Elusive Relationship,	 27	law & soC. inqUiRy 637	 (2002)	 (reviewing	M. ethan Katsh, the 
eleCtRoniC Media and the tRansFoRMation oF law (1989); M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital 
woRld (1995);	Ronald	K.L.	Collins	&	David	M.	Skover,	Paratexts,	44	stan. l. Rev. 509	(1992));	
Pamela	Samuelson, The Quest for Enabling Metaphors for Law and Lawyering in the Information 
Age,	94	MiCh. l. Rev.	2029	(1996)	(reviewing	M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital woRld (1995);	
JaMes boyle, shaMans, soFtwaRe, and spleens: law and the ConstRUCtion oF the inFoRMation 
soCiety (1996));	Eugene	Volokh,	Technology and the Future of Law,	47	stan. l. Rev.	1375	(1995)	
(reviewing	M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital woRld (1995)).	
	 	 	 Other	work	examining	the	effects	of	media,	old	and	new,	on	the	law	included	Ronald	K.L.	Collins	
&	David	M.	Skover,	Paratexts,	44	stan. l. Rev. 509	(1992);	Bernard	J.	Hibbitts, Coming to Our 
Senses: Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures,	41 eMoRy l.J.	873	(1992);	
Molly	Warner	Lien,	Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer,	48	aM. U. l. Rev.	86	
(1998);	Peter	W.	Martin,	The Internet: Full and Unfettered Access to Law—Some Implications,	26	n. 
Ky. l. Rev. 181	(1999).
	 111.	 Pantaloni,	supra	note	110,	at	682	(criticizing	the	view	that	“regards	the	relationship	between	tech-
nological	change	and	societal	and	cultural	changes	as	unilateral:	printing	and	other	communication	
technologies	are	seen	as	the	cause	of	all	that	is	surveyed”).
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in	areas	beyond	law	to	argue	that	“[w]hile	legal	indexes	may	have	influenced	the	
conceptual	coherence	of	 the	 law,	 they	are	as	much	a	product	as	a	progenitor	of	
that	conceptual	structure,”112	and	that	“[t]o	suggest	that	the	absence	of	indexes	will	
undermine	the	structural	coherence	of	the	law	ascribes	too	much	significance	to	
indexes	and	fails	to	recognize	other	normalizing	practices	in	the	law.”113
Computer-Based Searching and the Digest
¶36	 Dan	 Dabney’s	 “The	 Curse	 of	 Thamus:	 An	 Analysis	 of	 Full-Text	 Legal	
Document	 Retrieval,”	 published	 in	 1986,114	 also	 preceded	Berring’s	 first	major	
writings	 on	 the	 influences	 of	 legal	 information.	Although	 he	 said	 little	 directly	
about	 digests	 and	other	 traditional	 print-based	 tools,	Dabney	provided	 a	 frame-
work	for	evaluating	the	effectiveness	of	full-text	document	retrieval	systems	in	law	
that	could	be	used	to	compare	them	with	print	indexes	and	digests.115
¶37	A	first	response	to	the	issues	raised	in	Berring’s	High Technology Law 
Review article	appeared	in	Scott	Burson’s	1987	critique	of	Dabney’s	article.116	
Burson	acknowledged	the	importance	of	Dabney’s	focus	on	“a	question	central	
to	 legal	research	and	legal	bibliography:	how	do	we	evaluate	our	 legal	 infor-
mation	retrieval	 tools?”	and	cited	Dabney’s	use	of	 the	concepts	of	relevance,	
recall,	 precision,	 and	 fallout,	 which	 provide	 a	 “framework	 [that]	 applies	
equally	 to	conventional	and	computer-assisted	information	retrieval	 tools.”117	
Burson	also	 attempted	 to	move	Dabney’s	 concerns	 into	 the	 areas	 considered	
by	Berring.	
¶38	 Burson	 questioned	 Dabney’s	 assertion	 that	American	 lawyers	 require	
high	 recall—a	 high	 percentage	 of	 relevant	 documents—in	 their	 research.118	
	 112.	 Id.	at	698–99.	
	 113.	 Id.	at	700	(citing	lloyd a. FalleRs, law withoUt pReCedent 35	(1969)).
	 114.	 Daniel	P.	Dabney,	The Curse of Thamus: An Analysis of Full-Text Legal Document Retrieval,	78	law 
libR. J. 5	(1986).	The	article	became	known	simply	as	“Thamus”	for	its	invocation	of	the	Egyptian	
king’s	concerns	about	the	impacts	of	writing	on	memory	and	wisdom.	See id.	at	5–6.	
	 115.	 Berring	immediately	cited	Dabney’s	“excellent	summary	of	indexing	theory”	in	his	own	discussion	of	
the	limitations	of	full-text	searching,	Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	32	n.24,	while	also	
considering	the	earlier	Blair	and	Maron	study	that	had	inspired	Dabney’s	work.	Id.	at	43–46	(discuss-
ing	David	Blair	&	M.E.	Maron,	An Evaluation of Retrieval Effectiveness for a Full-Text Document 
Retrieval System,	 28	CoMM. aCM	 289	 (1985)).	The	 influences	of	Dabney’s	 article	were	 apparent	
in	 later	attempts	 to	evaluate	 the	effectiveness	of	digests	and	other	 legal	research	tools.	Particularly	
important	examples	include	John	Doyle,	WESTLAW and the American Digest Classification System,	
84	 law libR. J. 229	 (1992);	 Ogden,	 supra	 note	 11;	 Marilyn	 R.	Walter,	 Retaking Control over 
Teaching Research,	43	J. legal edUC. 569,	572–80	(1993).	See also	Fritz	Snyder,	The West Digest 
System: The Ninth Circuit and the Montana Supreme Court,	60 Mont. l. Rev.	541	(1999);	Lee	F.	
Peoples,	The Death of the Digest and the Pitfalls of Electronic Research: What is the Modern Legal 
Researcher to Do?	97	law libR. J. 661,	2005	law libR. J.	41.
	 116.	 Scott	F.	Burson,	A Reconstruction of Thamus: Comments on the Evaluation of Legal Information 
Retrieval Systems,	79	law libR. J. 133	(1987).
	 117.	 Id.	at	133.	For	definitions	of	the	concepts,	see	Dabney,	supra	note	114,	at	14–17.
	 118.	 Burson,	supra	note	116,	at	136	(“Dabney	asserts,	ipse dixit,	that	legal	research	tools	should	aim	for	
high	 recall.”).	See	Dabney,	supra	 note	114,	 at	16	 (“The	adversary	 system	of	American	 law	puts	a	
high	 premium	on	 exhaustiveness	 in	 case	 research	 and	 thus	 needs	 retrieval	 systems	 that	maximize	
recall.”).	
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Rather	 than	 seeing	 “every	 single	 arguably	 relevant	 case	 when	 doing	 legal	
research	.	 .	 .	we	would	like	to	focus	our	efforts	on	the	heart	of	an	issue.”119	In	
addition,	 Burson	 questioned	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 apparently	 poor	 recall	 of	
CALR	searches,120	“because	additional	tools	remain	available	to	generalize	and	
expand	research.	.	.	.	[O]rdinarily	researchers	can	and	do	use	additional	tools;	the	
necessity	to	do	so	should	not	be	troubling	to	us.”121	Among	these	tools,	of	course,	
would	be	precoordinated	 indexes	 such	as	 those	 employed	 in	 the	West	digests.	
Dabney	had	identified	the	limitations	of	digest	searching	whether	the	researcher	
worked	 through	 the	 classification	 system	 itself	 or	 used	 the	 Descriptive	Word	
Index,122	concluding	that	“[a]ll	of	these	problems	can	be	traced	to	the	difficulties	
of	precoordinate	indexing.”123	
¶39	Berring	had	described	the	digest’s	shortcomings	in	his	High Technology 
Law Review article,124	but	had	also	begun	to	think	about	the	broader	impacts	
of	the	digest	system	on	the	practice	of	law,	matters	not	discussed	by	Dabney.	
Burson	 engaged	 that	 discussion,	 using	Berring’s	 piece	 and	 an	 earlier	 article	
by	 Rita	 Reusch125	 in	 a	 nuanced	 examination	 of	 how	 lawyers	 determine	 the	
“relevance”	of	cases	and	other	information	to	the	resolution	of	legal	problems.	
While	Dabney’s	idea	of	relevance	was	tied	closely	to	his	concerns	with	matters	
of	 searching	 and	measurable	 attributes	 such	 as	 recall	 and	 precision,	 Burson	
emphasized	 that	 the	 relevance	 of	 a	 document	 to	 an	 issue	 is	 more	 complex,	
depending	significantly	on	the	creativity	and	judgment	of	the	lawyer	analyzing	
the	document.	Referencing	Reusch,	he	noted:	“Good	indexing	really	represents	
an	analysis	or	a	conceptualization	of	a	body	of	law.	Legal	research	puts	a	high	
premium	on	finding	materials	outside	of	the	standard	conceptualization	of	an	
issue,	 for	 the	 novel	 and	 analogous	 rather	 than	 for	 the	 accepted	 treatment	 of	
an	issue.”126	Having	earlier	cited	Berring	as	authority	for	the	influence	of	the	
digests’	 precoordinated	 indexing	 on	American	 legal	 research,	 Burson	 noted	
Berring’s	discussion	of	“the	positive	aspects	of	the	West	conceptualization	of	
American	law	as	a	mechanism	for	confirming	and	controlling	legal	discourse	
and	development.”127	
Categorization and Classification
¶40	Berring’s	ideas	about	the	role	of	the	digest	beyond	its	place	as	a	case-finding	
tool	were	important	to	Burson’s	critique	of	Dabney,	but	were	not	central	to	most	
	 119.	 Burson,	supra	note	116,	at	139.
	 120.	 See	Dabney,	supra	note	114,	at	15–16.
	 121.	 Burson,	supra	note	116,	at	138.
	 122.	 Dabney,	supra	note	114,	at	12–14.
	 123.	 Id.	at	14.
	 124.	 Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	34–37.
	 125.	 Rita	Reusch,	The Search for Analogous Legal Authority: How to Find it When You Don’t Know What 
You’re Looking For?	legal ReFeRenCe seRviCes q.,	Fall	1984,	at	33.
	 126.	 Burson,	supra	note	116,	at	143	n.25	(citing	Reusch,	supra	note	125).
	 127.	 Id.	at	143	n.25	(citing	Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	31–33).
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of	 the	comments	spawned	by	Dabney’s	article.128	They	were	essential,	however,	
to	 the	 next	 burst	 of	 writing	 on	 the	 influences	 of	 legal	 information,	 a	 series	 of	
articles	applying	and	responding	to	the	use	of	the	tools	of	Critical	Legal	Studies	
(CLS)	to	 the	process	of	 legal	research.	In	1987,	Steve	Barkan	published	in	Law 
Library Journal an	 article	 suggesting	 how	 a	 CLS	 critique	might	 be	 applied	 to	
legal	research.129	The	following	year,	Virginia	Wise	published	an	introduction	to	
CLS	for	librarians	in	Legal Reference Services Quarterly,130	and	in	1989	Richard	
Delgado	 and	 Jean	 Stefancic	 used	 critical	 perspectives	 to	 analyze	 the	 impacts	
of	 legal	 indexes	 on	 the	 research	 process.131	 In	 1990,	 Peter	 Schanck	 challenged	
Barkan’s	article	in	Law Library Journal,132	prompting	a	response	by	Barkan133	and	
final	comments	by	Schanck.134	
¶41	Barkan,	who	had	earlier	written	an	insightful	commentary	on	the	historical	
context	of	legal	research	textbooks,135	focused	his	1987	article	on	applying	several	
CLS-related	concepts	 to	 legal	research,	 including	“the	nature	and	effects	of	cat-
egorizing	legal	problems,”136	matters	that	Berring	was	beginning	to	consider	in	his	
work.137	Barkan	defined	 legal	 research	as	“the	pragmatic,	goal-oriented	practice	
research	 of	 law	 practitioners,”	 rather	 than	 the	 research	 conducted	 in	 pursuit	 of	
legal	scholarship.138	He	found	that	contemporary	texts	described	legal	research	as	
a	search	for	legal	authority	or	“the	law”	needed	to	solve	a	problem,	and	reflected	
the	tendency	to	think	about	law	as	“pre-existing	and	given,	something	that	can	be	
	 128.	 Not	surprisingly,	Dabney’s	article	provoked	responses	from	representatives	of	the	commercial	CALR	
services.	See	Jo	McDermott,	Another Analysis of Full-Text Legal Document Retrieval,	78	law libR. 
J.	337	(1986)	(McDermott	was	Product	Information	Manager,	Mead	Data	Central);	Craig	E.	Runde	
&	William	H.	Lindberg,	The	Curse	of	Thamus: A Response,	78	law libR. J.	345	(1986)	(Runde	was	
Marketing,	Special	 Projects,	West	Pub.	Co.;	Lindberg,	Westlaw	Administrator,	West	Pub.	Co.);	 as	
well	as	Dabney’s	rejoinder,	Daniel	P.	Dabney,	A Reply to West Publishing Company and Mead Data 
Central on The	Curse	of	Thamus,	78	law libR. J.	349	(1986).	See also Bing,	supra	note	93	(trac-
ing	some	of	the	history	of	full-text	information	retrieval	in	law	and	probing	Dabney’s	discussion	of	
relevance	and	recall,	but	not	broaching	the	issues	being	raised	by	Berring).
	 129.	 Steven	M.	Barkan,	Deconstructing Legal Research: A Law Librarian’s Commentary on Critical Legal 
Studies,	79	law libR. J. 617	(1987)	[hereinafter	Barkan,	Deconstructing Legal Research].
	 130.	 Virginia	 Wise,	 Of Lizards, Intersubjective Zap, and Trashing: Critical Legal Studies and the 
Librarian,	legal ReFeRenCe seRviCes q.,	1988,	no.	1–2,	at	7.	Wise’s	essay	and	bibliography	intro-
duced	the	major	themes	of	Critical	Legal	Studies	and	identified	the	primary	writers.	
	 131.	 Richard	 Delgado	 &	 Jean	 Stefancic,	 Why Do We Tell the Same Stories: Law Reform, Critical 
Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma?	42	stan. l. Rev. 207	(1989).	See also	Jean	Stefancic	
&	Richard	Delgado,	Outsider Jurisprudence and the Electronic Revolution: Will Technology Help or 
Hinder the Cause of Law Reform? 52	ohio state l. J. 847,	853–54	(1991).
	 132.	 Peter	 C.	 Schanck,	 Taking Up Barkan’s Challenge: Looking at the Judicial Process and Legal 
Research,	82	law libR. J. 1	(1990).
	 133.	 Steven	M.	Barkan,	Response to Schanck: On the Need for Critical Law Librarianship, or Are We All 
Legal Realists Now?	82	law libR. J. 23	(1990)	[hereinafter	Barkan,	Response to Schanck].
	 134.	 Peter	C.	Schanck,	The Last Word (I Hope),	82	law libR. J. 37	(1990).
	 135.	 Barkan,	On Describing Legal Research,	supra	note	92.
	 136.	 Barkan,	Deconstructing Legal Research,	supra	note	129,	at	618.
	 137.	 See	Berring,	Form Molds Substance,	supra	note	9,	at	25.
	 138.	 Barkan, Deconstructing Legal Research,	supra	note	129,	at	621.	See id. for	discussion	of	the	distinctions	
between	“practice	research”	and	the	scholarly	research	undertaken	by	law	professors	and	others.
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found	in	the	library.”139	The	process	of	legal	research	begins	with	an	analysis	of	
the	facts	of	the	problem,	followed	by	an	attempt	to	fit	the	facts	into	“one	or	more	
predetermined	categories.”140	As	Barkan	put	it:
The	categories	might	be	broad,	such	as	contracts,	torts,	or	crimes.	They	might	be	narrow,	
such	as	rights,	privileges,	and	immunities.	The	categories	might	be	implicit,	such	as	the	tra-
ditional	subject	divisions	that	are	taught	in	law	schools,	or	explicit,	such	as	those	in	West’s	
Digest	and	Key	Number	Systems.	The	categories	are	the	access	points	to	information	and	
are	reinforced	in	our	legal	research	tools.141
¶42	Divisions	and	categories	are	necessary	 for	 legal	 research,	as	well	as	 for	
legal	thought	and	analysis.	Barkan	cited	Duncan	Kennedy	not	only	for	the	proposi-
tion	that	“[i]t	is	impossible	to	think	about	the	legal	system	without	some	categori-
cal	scheme,”	but	also	for	the	notion	that	“all	such	schemes	are	lies.”142	Relying	on	
Kennedy	and	other	writers	with	CLS	perspectives,	Barkan	first	noted	that	“many	
legal	situations	do	not	fit	neatly	into	the	categorical	scheme,”	then	developed	the	
CLS	insight	that	“categorical	schemes	are	used	to	mask	the	incoherence	and	inde-
terminacy	of	legal	doctrine.”143	Through	reification,	categories	become	“tangible,	
real	things	.	.	.	built	by	history,	human	nature,	and	economic	law,	when	in	reality	
they	are	created	by	society’s	dominant	interests.”144
¶43	In	legal	research,	“[t]he	way	that	law	is	organized	and	categorized	in	our	
research	sources	affects	 its	 interpretation	and	results	 in	a	form	of	‘bibliographic	
determinism.’.	 .	 .	Key	numbers,	 indexes,	 annotations,	 footnotes	 and	 cross-refer-
ences	set	the	limits	of	inquiry;	they	‘narrow	the	window’	so	to	speak.”145	Barkan	
suggested	 that	 we	 should	 look	more	 closely	 at	 the	 relationships	 between	 legal	
resources	and	the	substantive	development	of	the	law,	then	cited	Berring	and	oth-
ers	for	“solid	claims	 that	West	helped	shape	 the	nature	of	American	 law.”146	He	
also	quoted	Berring’s	statement	that	“in	law,	more	than	any	other	discipline,	the	
structure	of	the	literature	implies	the	structure	of	the	enterprise	itself.”147
	 139.	 Id.	at	619–20	(citing	definitions	in	MoRRis l. Cohen & RobeRt C. beRRing, how to Find the law 
2	(8th	ed.	1983);	J. MyRon JaCobstein & Roy M. MeRsKy, FUndaMentals oF legal ReseaRCh 6	
(1987	ed.)).	 In	contrast	 to	 the	definitions	 in	 those	 texts,	Barkan	also	cited	 favorably	 the	definition	
provided	by	Frederick	C.	Hicks	in	1933,	which	employs	the	term	“legal,”	not	to	describe	the	subject	
matter	of	legal	research,	but	to	describe	“the	agents	and	the	purposes”	of	the	research.	Id. at	620	(cit-
ing	hiCKs	(1933),	supra	note	39,	at	1).
	 140.	 Id.	at	623.
	 141.	 Id.	at	624.
	 142.	 Id.	at	631	(quoting	Duncan	Kennedy,	The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries,	28	bUFF. l. Rev.	
209,	215	(1979)).
	 143.	 Id.
	 144.	 Id.	at	632	n.74	(citing	Peter	Gabel,	Reification in Legal Reasoning,	in	MaRxisM and law 262,	263	
(Piers	Beirne	&	Richard	Quinney	eds.,	1982)).
	 145.	 Id.	at	632.	In	support,	Barkan	cited	Llewellyn’s	idea	of	the	“threat	of	the	available.”	Id.	n.77	(citing	
KaRl n. llewellyn, JURispRUdenCe: RealisM in theoRy and pRaCtiCe 82	(1962)).	On	the	“threat	
of	the	available,”	see	supra	note	72.
	 146.	 Id.	 at	 633	 (citing	gilMoRe,	 supra	 note	 85,	 at	 58–59;	MaRtin MayeR, the lawyeRs 431	 (1967);	
RobeRt b. stevens, law sChool: legal edUCation in aMeRiCa FRoM the 1850s to the 1980s, at 
132–33	(1983);	Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	32–33,	33–34,	36).
	 147.	 Id.	at	633–34	(citing	Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	29).
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¶44	In	his	concluding	paragraphs,	Barkan	emphasized	the	importance	for	legal	
research	of	the	questions	raised	by	Critical	Legal	Studies:
Do	we	place	an	inordinate	emphasis	on	locating	“authority”	in	 the	published	sources	of	
the	law?	Do	precedents	matter	as	much	as	we	say	they	do?	How	much	control	do	research	
tools	assert	over	research	practice	and	legal	thinking?	Do	we	find	information	in	research	
because	we	need	it,	or	do	we	need	it	only	because	it	is	there?148
He	 closed	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	 established	 “simplistic,	 outdated,	 formalistic	
model”	 of	 legal	 research	 had	 not	 changed	 since	Langdell	 first	 posited	 his	 view	
that	law	is	a	science	and	the	law	library	its	laboratory,	then	speculated	about	how	
computer-assisted	legal	research	and	other	electronic	technologies	would	impact	
both	legal	research	and	the	development	of	the	law.149
¶45	Two	years	 later,	Richard	Delgado	and	Jean	Stefancic	extended	Barkan’s	
focus	on	the	 influences	of	categories	 in	 their	Stanford Law Review essay,	“Why	
Do	We	Tell	 the	 Same	 Stories?”	which	 analyzed	 the	 constraining	 effects	 of	 the	
categories	employed	in	the	standard	legal	research	indexing	systems:	the	Library	
of	 Congress	 Subject	 Headings,	 legal	 periodical	 indexes,	 and	 the	 West	 Digest	
System.150	Focusing	 first	on	 the	headings	used	 in	periodical	 indexes	and	by	 the	
Library	 of	 Congress,	 Delgado	 and	 Stefancic	 noted	 the	 commonalities	 in	 the	
sources	used	to	establish	headings	in	the	indexes:
The	Index to Legal Periodicals lists	Black’s Law Dictionary (published	by	West)	and	West’s	
Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary as	sources	of	authority	for	its	subject	headings.	Current Law 
Index is	based	on	Library	of	Congress	subject	headings	with	modifications.	The	Library	of	
Congress	lists	Black’s Law Dictionary and	Current Law Index as	principal	sources	used	to	
establish	authority.	The	circle	is	nearly	complete.151
Next,	citing	Berring,	Barkan,	and	other	writers,	Delgado	and	Stefancic	traced	the	early	
history	of	the	West	Digest	System,152	noting	not	only	its	perceived	benefits	in	provid-
ing	an	organizing	framework	for	the	“unwieldy	body	of	American	law”	at	the	turn	of	
the	twentieth	century,153	but	also	the	sense	that	“what	began	as	a	system	abstracted	and	
constructed	out	of	its	primary	source	data—judicial	opinions—had	transformed	itself	
into	a	rigid	grand	scheme	into which the law itself had to be fit.”154
	 148.	 Id.	at	635.
	 149.	 Id.	 at	636	 (“Will	CALR	free	us	 from	editors,	 indexers,	and	categorical	 schemes,	or	will	 it	 lead	 to	
greater	rigidity	in	legal	language	and	have	a	“freeze	effect”	on	the	law?	Will	computers	cause	more,	
or	less,	determinacy	in	the	law?	Will	artificial	intelligence	reify	categorical	schemes	even	more,	per-
mitting	us	to	find	only	what	artificial	intelligence	shows	us?”).
	 150.	 Delgado	&	Stefancic,	supra	note	131,	at	208	(“Their	categories	mirror	precedent	and	existing	law;	
they	both	 facilitate	 traditional	 legal	 thought	and	constrain	novel	 approaches	 to	 the	 law.”).	Virginia	
Wise’s	1988	introduction	to	Critical	Legal	Studies	for	law	librarians	had	pointed	out	that	“the	primary	
obstacle	 to	 locating	material	about	CLS	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 subject	 heading	 access”	 in	 both	 periodical	
indexes	 and	 in	 the	Library	 of	Congress	 Subject	Headings.	Wise,	 supra	 note	 130,	 at	 14.	 She	 thus	
anticipated	Delgado	and	Stefancic’s	work	for	one	area	of	the	legal	literature.
	 151.	 Delgado	&	Stefancic,	supra	note	131,	at	213	(citations	omitted).
	 152.	 Id.	at	214–16.
	 153.	 Id.	at	214.
	 154.	 Id.	at	215	(emphasis	added).
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¶46	Acknowledging	 that	 the	 classification	 systems	used	 in	 the	 legal	 indexes	
fulfill	 their	 intended	 purpose	 of	 helping	 researchers	 to	 locate	 relevant	 cases,	
articles,	and	books,	the	authors	pointed	out	that	these	systems	could	also	“create	
the	 false	 impression	 that	 law	 is	 exact	 and	 deterministic—a	 science—with	 only	
one	correct	answer	to	a	legal	question.”155	Operating	“in	a	coordinated	network	of	
information	retrieval,”	the	indexing	systems	“replicate	preexisting	ideas,	thoughts,	
and	approaches.”156	By	channeling	questions	into	outdated	categories,	they	create	
formidable	obstacles	to	those	researching	in	developing	or	changing	areas	of	the	
law.	
¶47	The	next	year,	in	an	occasionally	acerbic	response	to	Barkan’s	article,	Peter	
C.	Schanck	challenged	the	notions	that	the	digest	and	other	research	tools	play	a	
role	in	shaping	lawyers’	thinking	about	the	law	and	have	conservative	effects	on	
legal	development.	For	Schanck,	“[m]ost	lawyers	suffer	under	no	illusions	about	
the	law’s	‘seamless	web’	or	perfect	coherence,	so	the	West	digests	have	not	suc-
ceeded	in	deluding	practitioners.”157	
¶48	Based	on	his	personal	experiences	in	assisting	lawyers	with	their	research	
and	in	performing	his	own,	Schanck	presented	several	reasons	why	“key	numbers,	
headnotes,	indexes,	and	so	forth	have	had	little	or	no	impact	on	either	the	content	
of	our	law	or	our	understanding	of	the	legal	system”:
	 l	 attorneys	 tend	 to	 use	 more	 than	 one	 research	 system	 in	 performing	 their	
research	and	are	therefore	exposed	to	“a	variety	of	nondigest	classifications”;
	 l	 many	lawyers	claim	never	to	use	digests	in	their	research;
	 l	 lawyers	concentrate	on	the	facts	of	their	cases	and	are	likely	to	search	descrip-
tive	word	indexes	for	facts	rather	than	topical	analysis	for	legal	concepts;
	 l	 even	 if	 they	use	digests	exclusively,	 lawyers	 tend	 to	 look	at	 the	cases	 listed	
under	 several	 key	 numbers	 and	 to	 “pay	 little	 attention	 to	 the	 designations	
assigned	to	the	categories.”	By	the	end	of	the	process,	“the	West	structure	is	
long	forgotten	and	its	effects	negligible.”158
¶49	In	responding	to	Schanck,	Barkan	questioned	whether	lawyers	actually	are	
exposed	to	a	variety	of	classifications	or	“windows”	into	the	law	through	their	use	
of	tools	other	than	digests.	He	acknowledged	that	many	lawyers	do	not	use	digests,	
but	also	noted	that
[s]ome	 never	 consult	 indexes,	 treatises,	 or	 finding	 aids.	 .	 .	 .	 For	 many	 lawyers,	 legal	
research	 is	no	more	 than	consulting	a	 jurisdiction-specific	subject	 treatise	and	reading	a	
few	cases.	Some	lawyers	do	legal	research	only	through	law	clerks	and	paralegals	who	are	
	 155.	 Id.	at	216	(citing	William	F.	Birdsall,	The Political Persuasion of Librarianship,	libR. J.,	June	1,1988,	
at	75,	for	the	idea	that	“classifications	based	on	ideology	are	inevitably	normative,	but	few	indexers	
realize	this.”).	
	 156.	 Id.	at	217.
	 157.	 Schanck,	supra	note	132,	at	17.	Schanck	did	not	discuss	Delgado	and	Stefancic’s	1989	Stanford Law 
Review article,	which	may	not	have	been	available	at	the	time	he	wrote.
	 158.	 Id.	at	17–19.
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much	less	sophisticated	in	law	and	the	workings	of	the	legal	system.	Some	lawyers	never	
do	legal	research.159
Barkan	did	not	directly	answer	Schanck’s	third	and	fourth	points	about	how	law-
yers	actually	use	digests,	 saying	only	 that	“Schanck	minimizes	 the	conservative	
effects	of	finding	tools,	treatises,	and	other	forms	of	legal	resources,”160	and	sug-
gesting	that	Schanck’s	disagreement	might	actually	be	with	Berring’s	writings	on	
the	role	of	the	West	digests,	rather	than	with	Barkan	himself.161
¶50	 Jill	Anne	 Farmer’s	 1993	 article	 on	 poststructuralism	 and	 legal	 research	
discussed	 “the	 cultural	 determinants	 with	 which	 the	 user	 approaches	 informa-
tion,”162	citing	Berring,	Delgado	and	Stefancic,	and	others	for	their	comments	on	
the	influences	of	the	categories	of	the	West	digest	system,	other	standard	indexing	
tools	 in	 law,	 and	 the	 organizing	 structures	 of	 law	 libraries.163	 Farmer,	 however,	
further	 developed	 these	 points	 in	 her	 discussion	 of	 how	 legal	 citation	 practices	
limited	the	perspectives	of	legal	researchers.	Citing	Delgado’s	study	of	citations	in	
the	civil	rights	literature,164	as	well	as	commentary	by	legal	citations	scholar	Fred	
Shapiro,165	Farmer	concluded	that	“to	the	extent	that	current	research	is	informed	
by	 citations	 to	what	 came	before,	 the	 probability	 that	 one’s	 perspective	will	 be	
broadened	is	not	very	high.”166 While	true	in	all	disciplines,	these	patterns	may	be	
particularly	strong	in	law	because	of	such	factors	as	the	discipline’s	penchant	for	
detailed	citation	of	authorities	and	publishers’	 tendencies	 to	 reference	 their	own	
publications	and	services.167
Boundaries of the Universe
¶51	 In	 discussing	 the	 respective	 roles	 of	 primary	 and	 secondary	 sources	 in	 his	
response	 to	 Schanck,	Barkan	 harked	 back	 to	 Frederick	Hicks’s	 “revered”	 1933	
textbook,	which	defined	legal	research	as	“the	inquiry	and	investigation	necessary	
to	be	made	by	 legislators,	 judges,	 lawyers	 and	 legal	writers	 in	 the	performance	
of	 their	 functions.”168	As	Barkan	 put	 it,	 “[Hicks]	made	 the	 point	 of	 noting	 that	
	 159.	 Barkan,	Response to Schanck,	supra	note	133,	at	30.	
	 160.	 Id.
	 161.	 Id.	at	30	n.35.	Berring’s	later	articles	do	not	discuss	the	points	raised	by	Schanck.
	 162.	 Jill	Anne	Farmer,	A Poststructuralist Analysis of the Legal Research Process,	85	law libR. J. 391,	
396	 (1993).	 See	 also	Michael	Duggan	&	David	 Isenbergh,	Poststructuralism and the Brave New 
World of Legal Research,	86	law libR. J.	829	(1994).
	 163.	 Farmer,	supra	note	162,	at	397–400.	Farmer	notes	that	the	information	found	in	law	libraries	“is	pre-
selected	and	conceptually	constrained.	Moreover,	the	means	by	which	this	information	is	organized	
inevitably	structures	our	perceptions.”	Id.	at	399	(quoting	Stephen	Jay	Gould,	Taxonomy as Politics,	
dissent,	Winter	1990,	at	73,	73	(“[C]lassifications	.	.	.	shape	our	thoughts	and	deeds	in	ways	that	we	
scarcely	perceive	because	we	view	our	categories	as	‘obvious’	and	‘natural.’”)).
	 164.	 Richard	Delgado,	The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,	132	U. 
pa. l. Rev.	561	(1984).	Delgado	found	that	leading	law	review	articles	written	on	civil	rights	topics	
by	white	male	writers	only	“infrequently”	cited	minority	scholars.	Id.	at	563.
	 165.	 Fred	Shapiro,	The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale	Law	Journal,	100	yale l.J. 1449	(1991).
	 166.	 Farmer,	supra	note	162,	at	401.
	 167.	 Id.
	 168.	 Barkan,	Response to Schanck,	supra	note	133,	at	33	(quoting	hiCKs	(1933),	supra	note	39,	at	1).
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‘[a]s	here	used,	the	word	legal	is	not	restrictive	as	to	subject	matter,	but	descrip-
tive	of	 the	agents	and	the	purposes	of	 the	 inquiries	 involved.’”169	Because	of	 its	
breadth	and	 its	acknowledgment	of	 the	roles	of	both	secondary	 legal	authorities	
and	nonlegal	sources,	Hicks’s	definition	seems	to	have	assumed	that	legal	research	
encompasses	more	sources	of	information	than	those	traditionally	found	in	the	law	
library	(or	now	in	 legal	databases),	 thus	calling	 into	question	whether	 the	print-
based	“conceptual	universe	of	thinkable	thoughts”	was	as	closed	as	Berring	and	
others	suggested,	and	had	opened	only	with	the	advent	of	the	electronic	research	
systems.170
¶52	 In	 their	 1997	 article	 “Legal	 Positivism	 as	 Legal	 Information,”	 Fred	
Schauer	 and	Virginia	Wise	 found	 it	 “intriguing”	 that	 “those	 scholars	who	 have	
claimed	 that	 new	 forms	of	 information	 retrieval	 have	 transformed	 the	nature	of	
law”	had	devoted	almost	all	of	their	attention	to	the	effects	of	categorization	rather	
than	to	the	ways	that	information	(the	sources	of	law)	establishes	law’s	boundar-
ies.171	Schauer	and	Wise	themselves	explored	the	changing	boundaries	of	the	law	
in	their	1997	article	and	in	another	published	in	2000.	In	the	former,	they	argued	
that,	“as	a	theoretical	matter,	the	most	useful	conception	of	law	is	a	claim	of	lim-
ited	domain,”172	and	 that	 the	most	plausible	basis	 for	 this	claim	 is	“information	
differentiation”:	the	idea	that	“the	information	set	upon	which	lawyers	rely	is	dif-
ferent	from	the	information	set	other	decisionmakers	employ.”173	At	a	time	of	dra-
matic	changes	in	how	lawyers	obtain	information,	it	was	worth	exploring	whether	
not	only	the	quantity	of	information	with	which	lawyers	must	deal,	but	also	“the	
very	nature	of	the	information	base—the	sources—on	which	legal	decisionmakers	
rely”	were	changing.	Could	“changes	in	the	nature	of	legal	sources	have	in	turn	
produced	commensurate	changes	in	the	nature	of	law	itself”?174
	 169.	 Id.	 (quoting	hiCKs	 (1933),	supra	note	39,	at	1).	See also Barkan,	Deconstructing Legal Research,	
supra	note	129,	at	621	(citing	hiCKs	(1933), supra note	39,	at	32–33)	(“[I]nformation	can	be	neces-
sary	and	functionally	related	to	law,	without	being	identifiably	legal.”).
	 170.	 In	addition	to	Hicks,	Barkan	cited	Marjorie	Rombauer	for	the	proposition	that	“the	materials	from	
which	legal	arguments	can	be	made	‘are	limited	only	by	your	imagination	in	seeking	them	out	and	
your	 own	 realistic	 evaluation	 of	 their	 persuasiveness.’”	 Barkan,	Response to Schanck,	 supra	 note	
133,	 at	 34	 (quoting	MaRJoRie diCK RoMbaUeR, legal pRobleM solving: analysis, ReseaRCh, 
and wRiting 211	(1983)).	He	also	noted	Rombauer’s	use	of	Karl	Llewellyn’s	statement	that	“[a]ny	
effort	at	limitation	to	‘legal’	literature	has	for	now	some	forty	years	been	growing	into	something	so	
arbitrary	and	inept	as	to	verge	on	farce.”	Id.	at	34	(quoting	KaRl n. llewellyn, the CoMMon law 
tRadition: deCiding appeals 234	(1960)).
	 171.	 Schauer	&	Wise,	Legal Positivism,	supra	note	78,	at	1095–96	(citing	works	by	Berring,	Katsh,	and	
Eugene	Volokh	as	examples).	But see, e.g.,	Katsh, eleCtRoniC Media,	supra	note	105,	at	223	(“If	
law	cannot	be	expected	to	possess	the	same	internal	organization	in	the	future,	neither	can	it	expect	
its	external	boundaries	to	remain	as	fixed	as	they	are	today.”);	Stefancic	&	Delgado,	supra	note	131,	
at	 854	 (pointing	out	 that	 law	 libraries	may	 serve	 as	gateways	 to	 “the	 literature	of	 other	 academic	
disciplines,	 statistical	data,	news	reports,	and	even	monographs”).	There	also	were	attempts	 in	 the	
legal	research	literature	to	introduce	lawyers	to	electronic	sources	for	nonlegal	information. See, e.g.,	
S.	Blair	Kauffman,	Electronic Databases in Legal Research: Beyond Lexis and Westlaw,	13	RUtgeRs 
CoMpUteR & teCh. l.J. 73	(1987).
	 172.	 Schauer	&	Wise,	Legal Positivism,	supra	note	78,	at	1096.
	 173.	 Id.	at	1102.
	 174.	 Id.	at	1102–03.
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¶53	In	1997,	 increasingly	more	nonlegal	 information	was	available	 to	 lawyers	
than	when	 they	were	 limited	 to	 the	materials	of	 the	print	 law	 library	or	 the	early	
versions	of	LexisNexis	and	Westlaw,	which	largely	mimicked	what	was	available	in	
hard	copy.175	But,	does	increased	availability	mean	increased	use?	Presenting	pre-
liminary	results	from	their	own	study	of	Supreme	Court	citation	practices,	Schauer	
and	Wise	 concluded	 that	 “starting	 in	1991,	 there	has	been	a	 substantial	 and	con-
tinuing	 increase	 in	 the	Court’s	citation	of	non	 legal	sources.”176	This	was	perhaps	
enough	of	a	change	in	the	information	set	to	signal	both	a	shift	in	the	information	
boundaries	of	law	(something	Schauer	and	Wise	labeled	“the	delegalization	of	law”)	
and	 the	 possibility	 “that	 changes	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 legal	 information	will	 produce	
changes	in	the	nature	of	law.”177	Their	2000	article,	“Nonlegal	Information	and	the	
Delegalization	of	Law,”	presented	the	results	of	their	studies	of	citations	in	opinions	
of	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court,	the	lower	federal	courts,	and	the	Supreme	Court	of	New	
Jersey,	each	of	which	showed	more	citations	to	nonlegal	sources	after	1990,	about	
the	 time	when	nonlegal	materials	became	more	 readily	accessible	 to	 lawyers	and	
courts	through	LexisNexis	and	Westlaw	or	other	databases.178
	 175.	 Id.	at	1106.
	 176.	 Id.	at	1108.	
	 177.	 Id.	at	1109.
	 178.	 Schauer	&	Wise,	Nonlegal Information,	supra	note	78.	Schauer	and	Wise	were	not	the	first	to	study	
the	citation	practices	of	the	federal	and	state	courts,	although	they	were	among	the	first	to	focus	on	
the	courts’	uses	of	nonlegal	sources.	Since	John	Henry	Merryman,	The Authority of Authority: What 
the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950,	 6	stan. l. Rev	 613	 (1954),	 an	 early	work	on	what	
judges	cite	as	authority,	legal	writers	have	explored	the	citation	patterns	of	federal	and	state	courts,	
an	endeavor	made	much	easier	by	 the	full-text	search	capabilities	and	retrospective	case	 law	data-
bases	of	LexisNexis	and	Westlaw.	For	an	introduction	to	these	studies,	see	Shapiro,	supra	note	165,	
at	1455–58.	
	 	 	 In	general,	those	citation	studies	that	have	looked	for	references	to	nonlegal	sources	in	state	court	
opinions	have	 found	 few.	See	A.	Michael	Beard, Citations to Authority by the Arkansas Appellate 
Courts, 1950–2000,	25	U. aRK. little RoCK l.Rev.	301,	327–28	(2003);	Lawrence	M.	Friedman	et	
al.,	State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation,	33	stan. l. Rev.	773,	817	(1981);	James	
Leonard,	An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990,	86	
law libR. J.	129,	146	(1994);	William	H.	Manz,	The Citation Practices of the New York Court of 
Appeals, 1850–1993,	43	bUFF. l. Rev.	121,	145–46	(1995);	William	H.	Manz,	The Citation Practices 
of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update,	49	bUFF. l. Rev.	1273,	1289–90	(2001);	
Merryman,	supra at	670–72;	John	Henry	Merryman,	Toward A Theory of Citations: An Empirical 
Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970,	50	s. Cal. 
l. Rev.	 381,	 408	 n.22	 (1977).	See also	Dragomir	Cosanici	&	Chris	 Evan	Long,	Recent Citation 
Practices of the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals,	 legal ReFeRenCe 
seRviCes q.,	2005,	no.	1/2,	at	103;	Joseph	A.	Custer,	Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court 
and Kansas Court of Appeals,	Kan. J. l. & pUb. pol’y, Spring	1999,	at	126;	Paul	Hellyer,	Assessing 
the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research: A Study of California Supreme Court Opinions,	
97	law libR. J.	 285,	2005	law libR. J.	 16;	Fritz	Snyder,	The Citation Practices of the Montana 
Supreme Court,	57	Mont. l. Rev.	453	(1996).	
	 	 	 In	some	contrast	to	the	published	findings	regarding	state	reports,	Wes	Daniels’s	1983	study	of	U.S.	
Supreme	Court	opinions	suggested	slight,	but	increasing	citations	to	nonlegal	sources	for	the	years	he	
examined.	Wes	Daniels,	“Far Beyond the Law Reports”: Secondary Source Citations in United States 
Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978,	76	law libR. J.	1,	6,	18–20,	39–47	
(1983).	Daniels	concluded	by	noting	the	growing	number	of	research	databases	available	to	courts	
and	other	legal	researchers.	“As	this	body	of	easily	accessible	data	grows,	the	types	and	amounts	of	
nonlegal	sources	cited	by	lawyers	and	judges	inevitably	will	expand	accordingly.”	Id.	at	28.
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Continuing Influences
¶54	Berring’s	writings	 established	what	 is	 now	 the	 accepted	model	 for	 discuss-
ing	 legal	 information	 in	 the	United	States.	Although	 his	 own	most	 recent	writ-
ings	 focusing	on	 the	 influences	of	 legal	 information	were	published	 in	2000,179	
later	writers	have	continued	 to	discuss	changes	 in	 the	 formats	and	 structures	of	
legal	information	in	terms	of	their	impacts	on	West’s	print-based	systems,	and	to	
develop	themes	introduced	in	the	works	of	Berring	and	other	writers.180	
¶55	 Has	 the	 later	 literature	 improved	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 impacts	 of	
the	shift	 to	electronic	sources	of	 legal	 information	beyond	the	 insights	provided	
by	Berring	 and	 others?	 Some	 answers	 are	 provided	 in	 three	 thoughtful	 articles	
published	 in	 2002:	 Richard	 J.	 Ross’s	 “Communications	 Revolutions	 and	 Legal	
Culture:	An	Elusive	Relationship,”181	F.	Allan	Hanson’s	“From	Key	Numbers	 to	
Keywords:	 How	Automation	 Has	 Transformed	 the	 Law,”182	 and	 Paul	 Duguid’s	
“The	Social	Life	of	Legal	Information:	First	Impressions.”183	
¶56	 Richard	 Ross’s	 essay	 is	 a	 review	 both	 of	 Ethan	 Katsh’s	 books184	 and	
of	 K.L.	 Collins	 and	 David	 M.	 Skover’s	 1992	 California Law Review article:	
“Paratexts.”185	Writing	well	after	Katsh’s	last	major	writings	on	electronic	media	
and	the	law,	and	the	publication	of	the	Collins	and	Skover	article,	Ross	found	that	
their	work	“provide[d]	the	richest	and	most	detailed	predictive	scholarship”	on	the	
importance	of	communications	media	in	shaping	how	lawyers	think	and	what	they	
do.186	Few	others	“embrace	[their]	central	idea.	.	.	:	that	computerization	and	the	
internet	will	push	lawyer’s	[sic]	habits	of	thought	and	regnant	values	in	a	determi-
nate	direction	and	will	fundamentally	transform	legal	culture.”187
	 179.	 In	a	recent	article	commemorating	the	addition	of	the	one-millionth	volume	to	the	collection	of	the	
University	 of	Minnesota	Law	Library,	Berring	 returned	 briefly	 to	 the	 themes	 of	 his	 earlier	work.	
Robert	C.	Berring,	Deconstructing the Law Library: The Wisdom of Meredith Willson,	89	Minn. l. 
Rev. 1381,	1395–1402	(2005).
	 180.	 There	is	not	space	to	discuss	all	of	the	most	insightful	post-2000	literature.	Of	particular	note	(though	
not	discussed	here)	are	Paul	Douglas	Callister,	Law’s Box: Law, Jurisprudence and the Information 
Ecosphere,	74	UMKC l. Rev. 263,	263	n.2	(2005)	(citing	Berring	as	the	“the	singular	voice	in	the	
wilderness,	warning	of	the	potential	consequences	to	legal	thinking	.	.	.	from	legal	research	tools”);	
Trosow,	supra note 93,	at	64	(examining	“several	aspects	of	[the]	relationship	between	information	
technology	and	the	occupational	structures	and	practices	in	the	field	of	law”);	and	Samuel	E.	Trosow,	
The Ownership and Commodification of Legal Knowledge: Using Social Theory of the Information 
Age as a Tool for Policy Analysis,	30	Manitoba l.J. 417	(2004)	(examining	competing	models	for	
thinking	about	the	relationships	between	information	technology	and	social	and	economic	changes).
	 181.	 Ross,	supra	note	110.
	 182.	 Hanson,	Key Numbers to Keywords,	supra	note	2.	See	also	F.	Allan	Hanson,	From Classification to 
Indexing: How Automation Transforms the Way We Think,	18	soC. episteMology 333	(2004)	[here-
inafter	Hanson, Classification to Indexing].
	 183.	 Paul	Duguid,	The Social Life of Legal Information: First Impressions,	FiRst Monday,	Sept.	2002,	
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_9/duguid/index.html.	 Duguid	 claimed	 that	 his	 “only	 qualifica-
tion	for	writing	this	paper	may	be	my	complete	lack	of	qualifications,	for	my	dealings	with	the	law	
and	lawyers	have	been	few.”	Id.	at	n.1.
	 184.	 Katsh, the eleCtRoniC Media,	supra note	105;	Katsh, law in a digital woRld,	supra note	105.
	 185.	 Collins	&	Skover,	supra	note	110.
	 186.	 Ross,	supra	note	110,	at	638.
	 187.	 Id.	at	640	n.2.
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¶57	Ross	briefly	summarized	the	common	story	told	by	Katsh	and	by	Collins	
and	Skover	regarding	the	impacts	of	print	on	the	development	of	the	law	and	the	
possible	 effects	 of	 electronic	media	 on	 its	 future	 development,	 then	 placed	 the	
three	within	“a	particular	theoretical	tradition”	that	led	them	to	“assume	that	com-
puters	and	the	Internet	will	have	relatively	direct,	linear,	powerful,	and	unmediated	
effects	on	legal	thought	and	practice.”188	Ross	connected	the	approaches	of	Katsh	
and	Collins	and	Skover	to	those	of	Marshall	McLuhan,	Harold	Innis,	and	others	
whose	post-World	War	II	writings	“isolated	‘media’	as	an	object	of	study	by	dis-
tinguishing	between	the	forms	of	communication	and	the	content	they	happen	to	
carry.”189	In	Ross’s	view,	Katsh	and	Collins	and	Skover	are	“legal	McLuhanites”190	
whose	 research	methodologies	 are	 “universalist,”	 an	 approach	 that	 “isolates	 the	
medium	as	an	independent	variable	that	produces	identifiable	effects.”191	A	“con-
textualist”	researcher,	on	the	other	hand,	recognizes	that	“[t]he	effects	of	a	medium	
prove	difficult	to	extricate	from	the	attributes	and	processes	of	the	society	in	which	
is	embedded.”192	For	Ross,	“[m]ost	 legal	scholars	who	consider	the	influence	of	
computers	and	the	Internet	on	law	are	implicitly	contextualists.”193
¶58	The	 bulk	 of	 the	 article	 critiques	 four	 “case	 studies”	 describing	 areas	 in	
which	Katsh	and	others	had	explored	the	impacts	of	media:	the	doctrine	of	prec-
edent,	 dispute	 resolution,	 abstraction	 in	 legal	 thought,	 and	 the	 coherence	 and	
identity	of	the	legal	profession.	Ross’s	analysis	of	the	case	studies	suggests	short-
comings	in	the	legal	McLuhanites’	assumptions	about	the	impacts	of	non-media	
forces	on	the	influences	of	media	on	the	law,194	and	the	need	to	recognize	that	a	
medium’s	influences	on	society	are	“fully”	a	product	of	how	the	system	is	used	
in	the	society.195	The	article	closes	with	a	discussion	of	models	of	causation	and	
suggestions	for	applying	research	methodologies	that	might	more	clearly	delineate	
the	causative	influences	of	media	on	the	law.196
¶59	 F.	Allan	 Hanson	 is	 an	 anthropologist,	 with	 research	 interests	 in	 index-
ing	 and	 classification.197	His	Law Library Journal	 article	 begins	with	 a	 nod	 to	
Carol	 Bast	 and	 Ransford	 Pyle’s	 earlier	 discussion	 of	 changing	 legal	 research	
paradigms,198	noting	that	both	print-based	and	computer-based	research	paradigms	
	 188.	 Id.	at	639.
	 189.	 Id.	at	642.
	 190.	 Id.	at	646.
	 191.	 Id.	at	647.
	 192.	 Id.
	 193.	 Id.	Ross	does	not	discuss	Berring	in	his	essay,	perhaps	considering	him	a	contextualist,	or	among	the	
“majority”	of	writers	in	this	area	who	“adopt	a	short-	to	medium-range	perspective	of	5–15	years	and	
concentrate	on	a	limited	set	of	doctrinal	accommodations	to	electronic	communications.”	Id.	at	640	
n.2.	
	 194.	 Id.	at	660.	
	 195.	 Id.	at	661.
	 196.	 Id.	at	664–78.	
	 197.	 He	notes	that	his	work	is	based	on	statistics	and	interviews	with	lawyers	and	others,	as	well	as	on	
secondary	literature.	Hanson,	Key Numbers to Keywords,	supra	note	2,	at	564,	¶	3.
	 198.	 Id.	at	563–64	(citing	Bast	&	Pyle,	supra	note	2,	at	286–88,	¶¶	5–13).
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are	examples	of	paradigms	for	information	management,	or	“techniques	for	orga-
nizing,	storing,	 retrieving	and	using	 information.”199	Following	Berring,	Hanson	
noted	that	users	of	classification	systems	such	as	the	West	digest	may	over	time	
forget	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 systems	 and	 attribute	more	 to	 them	 than	 is	warranted,	
something	perhaps	particularly	likely	to	occur	in	an	area	like	law	where	the	catego-
ries	of	the	West	system	reflect	those	used	in	legal	education.200	Importantly,	as	an	
information	management	device,	the	West	classification	system	helped	support	the	
proposition	that	law	is	“a	field	of	endeavor	wholly	separate	and	distinct	from	all	
others”	with	its	own	“self-referential”	means	for	accessing	sources	of	authority.201	
Hanson’s	 description	 of	 the	 “bounded	 and	 hierarchically	 organized”	 domain	 of	
legal	literature202	is	an	insightful	representation—from	a	nonlawyer—of	Berring’s	
universe	of	thinkable	thoughts.
¶60	Hanson’s	most	important	contribution,	perhaps,	is	his	insistence	on	keep-
ing	 clear	 the	 differences	 between	 indexing	 and	 classification,203	 a	 distinction	
that	 is	 perhaps	not	made	as	 consistently	 as	 it	might	be	 in	 the	 legal	 information	
literature.204	 Hanson	 describes	 classification	 as	 the	 organization	 of	 “a	 body	 of	
information	according	 to	some	conceptual	scheme.	 .	 .	 .	 [T]he	distinctive	feature	
of	 classification	 is	 that	 it	 reflects	 ideas	 about	 meaningful	 relationships	 among	
the	parts	in	the	body	being	classified.	.	.	.	A	classification	is	a	‘top-down’	device,	
where	the	relationship	between	particular	items	is	intelligible	in	terms	of	general	
principles.”205
¶61	 In	 contrast,	 an	 index	 is	 a	 finding	 device	 that	 connects	 a	 symbol	 for	 a	
topic	 (usually	 a	word	or	 a	phrase)	with	 information	 stored	 in	 a	database	 (print,	
electronic,	or	in	“human	memory”).	Most	importantly,	unlike	classification,	“[i]n	
its	pure	form,	indexing	conveys	nothing	about	relationships	that	may	exist	among	
different	 topics.”206	 Prior	 to	 automation,	 both	 classifications	 and	 indexes	 were	
constructed	by	human	intelligence	to	create	tools,	such	as	classified	indexes	like	
the	West	 Key	 Number	 System,	 which	 serves	 “both	 the	 classification	 function	
of	organizing	 information	 in	 judicial	decisions	 in	 accordance	with	 a	 conceptual	
scheme	and	the	indexing	function	of	assisting	users	to	locate	the	information	they	
	 199.	 Id.	at	564,	¶	2.
	 200.	 Id.	at	569–71,	¶¶	19–21.
	 201.	 Id.	at	571,	¶	22.
	 202.	 Id.,	¶	23.	“In	all	of	these	ways,	the	form,	organization,	access,	and	transmission	of	legal	information	
has	integrally	participated	in	the	formation	of	‘the	law’	as	a	distinct	realm,	inhabited	by	a	distinct	and	
peculiarly	organized	profession	known	as	‘lawyers.’”	Id.	at	572,	¶	25.
	 203.	 Id.	at	573–75,	¶¶	29–33.	See also Hanson, Classification to Indexing,	supra	note	182,	at	334–36.
	 204.	 See,	 e.g.,	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 West	 Digest	 System	 in	 Barbara	 Bintliff,	 From Creativity to 
Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Computer Age,	88	law libR. J.	338,	342–43	(1996)	
(describing	the	use	of	“legal	terminology	and	major	‘fact	words’”	to	locate	key	numbers	in	the	digest	
without	noting	whether	the	fact	words	are	used	through	the	classification	outline	or	the	descriptive	
word	index).	See also Bast	&	Pyle,	supra	note	2,	at	290–92,	¶¶	17–26	(discussing	print	digest	and	
indexing).
	 205.	 Hanson,	Key Numbers to Keywords,	supra	note	2,	at	574,	¶	30.
	 206.	 Id.,	¶	31.
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want.”207	Automated	systems,	on	the	other	hand,	do	not	perform	the	classification	
function,	“but	operate	entirely	in	terms	of	indexing,”	thereby	promoting	a	view	of	
the	subject	matter	of	the	research	“as	a	depthless	congeries	of	facts	and	doctrines	
rather	 than	 the	 hierarchically	 organized	 system	 that	 presents	 itself	 in	 research	
with	print	sources.”208	The	classifications	used	in	print-based	legal	research	tools	
“convey	an	image	of	the	law	as	taxonomically	structured	in	terms	of	a	relatively	
few	general	principles,”	while	keyword	searching	in	electronic	databases	“conveys	
a	sense	of	the	law’s	organization	as	shallow	and	loose,	and	that	is	no	stimulus	to	
seek	high-level	principles.”209
¶62	In	a	later	article,	Hanson	placed	his	research	on	legal	indexing	and	clas-
sification	into	a	broader	discussion	of	contrasting	world	views,	which	he	labeled	
“classificatory”	and	“indexical.”210	Those	with	classificatory	world	views	prefer	
to	learn	or	make	new	contributions	to	knowledge	within	structures	of	established	
knowledge.	With	this	view,	classified	indexes	such	as	the	key	number	system	are	
considered	useful	both	because	“they	organize	the	law	in	a	hierarchical	system	of	
categories	 that	also	serve	as	devices	for	finding	 legal	 information	[and	because]	
the	 classificatory	 system	 .	 .	 .	 reveals	what	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 law	 really	 is.”211	
Researchers	with	indexical	worldviews	“do	not	articulate	what	they	want	to	know	
in	terms	of	what	is	out	there;	they	organize	what	is	out	there	in	terms	of	what	they	
want	to	know.”212	By	disregarding	classification,	automated	searching	“is	a	pivotal	
factor	in	a	shift	in	legal	worldview	from	classificatory	to	indexical.”213	For	Hanson,	
this	shift	in	worldview	(in	law	and	elsewhere)	is	evidence	of	a	cultural	movement	
away	 from	modernity	 toward	a	“positive	version	of	postmodernity,	grounded	 in	
habitual	behavior	that	features	greater	flexibility	and	creativity.”214
¶63	 Paul	 Duguid’s	 article,	 titled	 with	 a	 nod	 to	 his	 well-regarded	 book	The 
Social Life of Information (coauthored	with	John	Seely	Brown),215	focuses	on	the	
impacts	of	 technology	on	institutions	of	 legal	education:	 the	 law	school	and	the	
library.	Duguid’s	article	is	important	within	the	legal	information	literature	for	its	
emphasis	on	 the	concepts	of	“professional	community”	and	“practice”—matters	
that	he	 found	 to	be	“little	more	 than	commonplaces	 for	most	 lawyers	 .	 .	 .	 [but]	
not,	however,	quite	commonplace	in	discussions	of	legal	education	and	its	trans-
formation.”216	Duguid	 sees	 the	 practice	 of	 law	 less	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 activities	 of	
individual	lawyers	than	as	“a	distinctive	set	of	behaviours	shared	by	people	as	part	
of	sharing	an	occupation.”217	In	learning	to	become	a	lawyer	and	in	practice,	“law	
	 207.	 Id.,	¶	32.
	 208.	 Id.	at	575,	¶	33.
	 209.	 Id.	at	584,	¶	55.
	 210.	 Hanson, Classification to Indexing,	supra	note	182,	at	345–47.
	 211.	 Id.	at	348.
	 212.	 Id.	at	346.
	 213.	 Id.	at	349.
	 214.	 Id.	at	353.
	 215.	 John seely bRown & paUl dUgUid, the soCial liFe oF inFoRMation	(2000).
	 216.	 Duguid,	supra	note	183.
	 217.	 Id.
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is	inevitably	social,	the	learning	required	must	be	a	social	activity,	engaging	with	
shared	implicit	understanding	of	practice	as	well	as	shared	explicit	understandings	
of	prescription.”218
¶64	 Noting	 that	 “digital	 enthusiasts”	 generally	 avoid	 discussing	 matters	 of	
interpretation	of	 texts	 in	 favor	of	discussing	access,	 seeing	“[i]nterpretation	and	
meaning	 .	 .	 .	 as	 somehow	 unproblematic,	 self-evident,	 or	 transparent,”	 Duguid	
pointed	out	 that	meaning	 is	 actually	 “limited	 to	particular	 ‘interpretive’	or	 ‘dis-
cursive’	communities,”	such	as	that	of	the	law.	Quoting	Berring	for	the	idea	that	
“law	has	suffered	profound	loss	of	interpretive	authority,”219	Duguid	assigned	sig-
nificant	responsibility	to	technological	change.	“As	both	documents	and	ways	of	
reading	have	changed,	it	has	become	harder	to	impute	authority	to	the	text—even	
in	order	to	wrestle	with	it.	Consequently,	it	is	harder	to	distinguish	on	face	value	
the	useful	and	reliable	texts	from	the	unreliable.”220	Although	he	was	careful	not	to	
overemphasize	the	role	of	print	in	determining	the	workings	of	interpretive	com-
munities,	Duguid	was	clear	 in	his	assertion	that	 the	early	 twenty-first	century	is	
“a	period	in	which	the	conventions	of	interpretation	and	meaning	are	significantly	
underdetermined.	 .	 .	 .	 [A]	 period	 of	 diverging	 strategies,	 transient	 conventions,	
conflicting	 interests,	 community	 formation,	 dissolution,	 and	 reformation,	 and	
constant,	implicit	social	negotiation.”221	Duguid	compliments	Berring	for	detect-
ing	 these	“symptoms,”	but	counters	Berring’s	 suggestion	 that	 individual	author-
ity	 (“a	 new	Blackstone”)	will	 be	 needed	 to	 develop	 new	 sources	 of	 [cognitive]	
authority,222	with	an	argument	 that	“forms	of	communal	authority	[developed	in	
such	places	as	libraries]	will	be	more	important.	It	is	interpretive	communities	that	
construct	 shared	categories	and,	 through	 these,	allow	social	communication	and	
coordinated	practice	around	information.”223
Conclusion
¶65	The	writings	of	Bob	Berring	and	those	who	began	considering	the	influences	
of	 legal	 information	on	American	 legal	culture	 in	 the	mid-1980s	had	 immediate	
impacts	on	the	works	of	their	contemporaries,	while	establishing	a	vocabulary	that	
has	continued	to	be	applied	by	later	writers.224	Newer	writers	discuss	changes	in	
the	formats	and	structures	of	legal	information	in	terms	of	the	impacts	of	changes	
	 218.	 Id.
	 219.	 Id.	(quoting	Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	supra	note	1,	at	1688).
	 220.	 Id.	
	 221.	 Id.	 (citing	adRian Johns, the natURe oF the booK: pRint and Knowledge in the MaKing	
(1998)).
	 222.	 Id.	(citing	Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts,	supra	note	3	at	315,	318).
	 223.	 Id.	
	 224.	 By	 2002,	 some	writers	 discussed	 the	 universe	 of	 thinkable	 thoughts	 without	 commenting	 on	 the	
origins	of	the	concept	or	referring	to	Berring	or	other	writers.	See	Scott	Matheson,	Searching Case 
Digests in Print or Online: How to Find the “Thinkable Thoughts,” 11	peRspeCtives: teaChing 
legal Res. & wRiting 19,	19	(2002)	(suggesting	without	reference	that	the	key	number	system	itself	
is	“sometimes	called	the	‘universe	of	thinkable	thoughts’”).	
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on	West’s	print-based	systems,	and	echo	Berring’s	points	about	the	influences	of	
the	digest	classification	system	and	a	legal	information	universe	limited	largely	to	
the	case	law	published	in	West	reporters.225	Berring’s	ideas	provide	the	model	for	
discussing	the	influences	of	other	legal	forms	of	legal	information	in	the	United	
States,226	and	are	considered	by	writers	discussing	the	influences	of	legal	informa-
tion	in	other	jurisdictions.227	Topics	suggested	by	his	work	continue	to	be	of	prior-
ity	for	those	writing	about	legal	information.228	
¶66	Some	commentators	have	questioned	whether	the	West	systems	could	have	
been	as	 influential	as	 suggested	 in	Berring’s	work.	 In	1994,	Nazareth	Pantaloni	
expressed	cautions	about	putting	 too	much	stock	 into	 the	power	of	 indexes	and	
digests	to	mold	the	law,229	anticipating	some	of	the	broader	criticisms	of	the	uni-
versalist	 approaches	 of	 the	 “legal	McLuhanites”	 that	Richard	Ross	would	 offer	
in	 2002.230	 The	 most	 sustained	 criticisms	 were	 perhaps	 those	 offered	 by	 Peter	
Schanck	 in	 his	 response	 to	 Barkan’s	 Critical	 Legal	 Studies	 article	 in	 1990.	As	
noted	above,	Schanck	argued	that	Barkan’s	(and	Berring’s)	ideas	about	the	impacts	
of	digests	and	other	 tools	on	 lawyers’	 thinking	were	based	on	a	wrong	sense	of	
how	attorneys	actually	conduct	research.	Schanck	questioned	whether,	given	his	
own	 sense	of	 how	 the	 tools	were	used	 in	practice,	 they	 could	have	 the	broader	
impacts	claimed	for	them.231
¶67	 Schanck’s	 comments	 suggest	 at	 least	 that	 more	 research	 is	 needed	 to	
demonstrate	 the	connections	between	the	forms	and	structures	of	 legal	 informa-
	 225.	 See, e.g.,	James	G.	Milles,	Leaky Boundaries and the Decline of the Autonomous Law School Library,	
96	law libR. J. 387,	410	n.139,	2004	law libR. J.	25,	¶	50	(“Robert	C.	Berring	has	exhaustively	
demonstrated	the	influence	of	print-based	classification	schemes,	particularly	the	West	Digest	System	
and	the	Langdellian	emphasis	on	case	law,	on	American	law,	and	how	traditional	legal	authorities	are	
breaking	down	under	the	onslaught	of	technology.”).
	 226.	 See, e.g.,	Danner,	supra note	72,	at	154	(citing	Berring,	Form Molds Substance,	supra	note	9,	at	15,	
for	the	notion	“that	the	forms	in	which	legal	information	is	published	and	distributed	can	be	influen-
tial	in	the	development	of	legal	knowledge”).
	 227.	 See, e.g.,	Amanda	 Barratt,	New Rights—New Laws: South African Legal Literature in a Time of 
Transition,	 32	 int’l J. legal inFo. 390,	 390–91	 (2004)	 (“[Berring]	 argues	 that	 form	may	mould	
substance—that	is	the	way	in	which	the	literature	itself	is	arranged	may	shape	the	very	way	in	which	
the	community	thinks	about	the	law.”).	
	 228.	 Since	it	was	first	approved	in	1993,	the	research	agenda	of	the	American	Association	of	Law	Libraries	
has	included	the	topic:	“What	will	be	the	effects	of	increased	reliance	on	electronic	research	on	the	
development	of	the	law	once	researchers	are	no	longer	tied	to	the	structures	of	the	digest	and	other	
indexing	systems?”	Pantaloni,	supra	note	110,	at	699	(citing	Nancy	C.	Carter,	AALL Research Agenda 
and Grants Program,	aall newsl.,	Oct	1993,	at	92,	92).	With	the	addition	of	the	question	“Is	elec-
tronic	legal	research	changing	the	actual	law?”,	the	topic	remains	on	the	revised	(and	current)	AALL	
research	 agenda.	Am.	Ass’n	 of	 Law	Libraries,	AALL	Research	Agenda	 [§]	 IV.C	 (Nov.	 4,	 2000),	
reprinted in	aM. ass’n oF law libRaRies, aall diReCtoRy and handbooK	2006–2007,	at	517,	
519	(46th	ed.	2006),	available at	http://www.aallnet.org/committee/research/agenda.asp.
	 229. See supra	¶	35.
	 230.	 As	noted	earlier,	Ross’s	primary	critique	 is	of	 the	writings	of	Katsh	and	an	article	by	Collins	and	
Skover.	Ross	does	not	discuss	Berring	or	any	of	the	other	writers	(besides	Katsh)	examined	in	this	
article;	there	is	no	reason	to	assume	that	he	would	classify	them	with	the	authors	on	whom	he	focuses.	
See supra	text	accompanying	notes	189–93.
	 231.	 See supra	¶¶	47–48.
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tion,	and	lawyers’	ways	of	thinking.	Certainly,	the	Bowker	and	Star	propositions	
adopted	by	Berring	and	others	are	correct:	once	in	place	and	commonly	used,	clas-
sification	systems	constructed	initially	as	mere	organizing	tools	come	to	be	seen	
as	expressing	never-intended	truths	about	the	subject	being	classified.232	But	how	
does	(or	did)	this	actually	manifest	itself	in	law?	
¶68	The	West	Digest	System	classifies	 law	 into	 seven	major	 topics,	which	
then	break	down	hierarchically	into	other	topics	and	key	numbers.	But,	how	do	
the	 relationships	 among	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 system	make	 themselves	 known	
to	 lawyers	 as	 they	 conduct	 their	 research	 in	 practice?	At	 what	 levels	 are	 the	
relationships	 influential?	 Although	West	 classifies	 cases	 under	 the	 four-hun-
dred-plus	 topics	of	 its	classification	system,	 in	 its	print	digests	 (as	 in	 those	of	
other	 publishers	 and	 in	 other	 comprehensive	 legal	 research	 tools),	 the	 topics	
are	 presented	 to	 researchers	 in	 alphabetical	 order	 by	 topic	 name.	As	 Hanson	
suggests,	 the	 meaningful	 relationships	 inherent	 in	 classification	 are	 lost	 in	
alphabetical	 arrangement.233	Thus,	 in	 practical	 application,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 how	
a	researcher	would	 learn	 that	 the	 topic	“Licenses”	fell	 into	 the	overall	scheme	
under	 “Particular	Occupations”	within	 the	major	 topic	 “Persons”	unless	 he	or	
she	took	the	trouble	to	examine	the	outline	of	the	classification	system	instead	
of,	or	in	addition	to,	going	directly	to	the	volume	digesting	cases	on	“Licenses.”	
In	the	alphabetical	arrangement	of	topics	in	the	print	digests,	“Licenses”	is	found	
between	 “Libel	 and	 Slander”	 and	 “Liens,”	 which	 tells	 the	 researcher	 nothing	
about	 the	 relationships	 of	 Licenses	 to	 other	 topics.	 Similarly,	 how	 do	West’s	
descriptive	word	indexes	expose	researchers	to	the	relationships	among	the	ele-
ments	of	the	classification	system	when	their	point	seems	to	be	just	the	opposite:	
to	bring	the	lawyer	directly	to	cases	on	specific	points	of	interest,	bypassing	the	
larger	elements	of	the	system.234	None	of	this	is	to	argue	that	the	structures	of	
the	digest	do	not	influence	how	American	lawyers	think	about	the	law,	but	it	does	
suggest	 that	 Schanck’s	 questions	 about	 how	 this	 happens	 are	worthy	 of	more	
exploration	than	they	have	received.235
	 232.	 See supra	¶	19.
	 233.	 See Hanson, Classification to Indexing,	supra	note	182,	at	345.
	 234.	 The	Descriptive	Word	Index	was	introduced	in	1912	with	advertisements	noting	that	“[w]hile	it	is	true	
that	the	American	Digest	classification	is	simplicity	itself	.	.	.	.	[s]omething	else	was	needed—some-
thing	which	the	lawyer	could	turn	to	and	find	what	he	wanted,	in	the	same	way	as	he	would	a	diction-
ary.”	Editorial	by	the	Advertising	Manager,	west pUb. CoMpany’s doCKet, Sept.	1912,	inside	front	
cover.	Earlier	that	year,	an	article	in	West’s	own	“intercollegiate	law	review”	anticipated	the	publica-
tion	of	the	new	index	in	a	short	article,	noting	that	“[t]he	search	for	the	law	has	become	a	search	for	
facts	to	which	the	legal	principles	have	been	applied,	rather	than	a	search	for	the	abstract	principles	
themselves.”	R.A.	Daly,	The Descriptive Word,	3	aM. l. sCh. Rev.	79,	79	(1912).	
	 235.	 Do	we	know	more	about	how	lawyers	conduct	research	than	the	little	that	Morris	Cohen	suggested	
we	did	 in	1969?	Morris	L.	Cohen,	Research Habits of Lawyers, 9	 JURiMetRiCs J.183,	183	 (1969)	
(“[W]e	know	a	great	deal	about	 the	materials	of	 legal	 research	 .	 .	 .,	but	almost	nothing	about	 the	
actual	procedures	used	by	lawyers	in	their	search	into	the	law.”).	Cohen	referred	to	“the	books	of	the	
law,”	but	the	point	is	probably	true	today	regarding	computer-based	research	as	well.	See, e.g.,	Eric	
Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism,	8	yale J. l & teCh. 
188,	189	(2006)	(describing	how,	despite	their	“veneer	of	objectivity	and	credibility	[search	engines]	
systematically	favor	certain	types	of	content	over	others.”).
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¶69	Doubtless,	as	Berring	suggests,	whatever	influences	the	West	classification	
system	has	had	beyond	its	value	for	locating	cases	stems	from	its	introduction	at	a	
time	when	American	lawyers	could	see	its	connections	to	the	organizational	scheme	
of	the	still	influential	Blackstone’s	Commentaries	and	to	the	spread	of	the	case-based	
first-year	law	school	curriculum	developed	by	Langdell	at	Harvard.	It	might	be	use-
ful,	as	well,	to	look	more	closely	than	has	yet	been	done	at	other	aspects	of	the	con-
text	in	which	the	digest	system	developed.	The	last	quarter	of	the	nineteenth	century	
saw	vigorous	debates	among	American	lawyers	about	the	benefits	of	classifying	the	
law,	both	for	the	practical	purposes	of	locating	precedential	cases,	but	also	to	pro-
mote	educational	goals	and	professional	knowledge	and	understanding	of	the	law.236	
These	debates	continued	in	various	forums	and	at	changing	levels	of	intensity	until	
well	into	the	twentieth	century.237	The	most	recent	legal	information	literature	has	
so	far	not	looked	closely	at	other	attempts	to	classify	the	law	or	at	the	larger	debates	
about	classification	 that	have	characterized	American	 legal	history	 from	 the	early	
movements	for	codification	of	the	common	law	in	the	nineteenth	century	through	
the	establishment	of	the	Restatements	in	the	1920s.238
¶70	In	a	time	of	computer-based	legal	research,	when	declining	use	of	digests	
and	other	 resources	 in	print	 form239	may	have	curtailed	 the	usefulness	of	print-
based	models	for	examining	the	influences	of	legal	information,	it	is	important	to	
consider	what	approaches	or	models	will	be	most	useful	for	exploring	the	future	
roles	 and	 influences	 of	 legal	 information.	 The	 universe	 of	 thinkable	 thoughts	
defined	 itself	 largely	 in	 terms	 of	 published	 cases.	 Future	 inquiries	will	 need	 to	
consider	more	carefully	other	forms	of	law,	certainly	including	statutes	and	admin-
istrative	materials,	which	have	grown	in	importance	since	at	least	the	early	twen-
tieth	century,240	but	also	secondary	materials,	such	as	law	review	articles,	which	
	 236.	 See	 Emily	 Sherwin,	 Legal	 Taxonomy	 16–23	 (Cornell	 Legal	 Studies	 Research	 Paper	 No.	 06-020,	
2006),	available at	http://ssrn.com/abstract=925129	(discussing	purposes	of	classification).	She	notes	
that	 there	 are	 “two	 likely	purposes	 .	 .	 .:	 guiding	 the	outcomes	of	 adjudication	and	contributing	 to	
knowledge	of	and	discourse	about	the	law.”	Id.	at	16.
	 237.	 Some	of	the	historical	 literature	from	the	discussions	of	classification	is	 listed	in	Jay	M.	Feinman,	
The Jurisprudence of Classification,	 41	stan. l. Rev.	 661,	663	n.4	 (1989).	On	 the	Restatements,	
see	N.E.H.	Hull,	Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law 
Institute,	8	law & hist. Rev.	55	(1990).
	 238.	 My	own	initial	explorations	suggest	that	little	of	the	substantial	contemporary	literature	about	clas-
sification,	codification,	and	the	restatements	in	American	law	takes	into	consideration	the	actual	or	
possible	role	of	digest	classifications	in	answering	the	concerns	of	the	time.	See	Richard	A.	Danner,	
Classification	in	American	Law:	The	Influences	of	the	Digest	Tradition	[work	in	progress].
	 239.	 See	Bintliff,	supra	note	2,	at	249,	¶	1	(“The	debate	about	whether	print	or	electronic	resources	are	
better	for	legal	research	ended	essentially	because	the	consumers	of	the	resources	made	a	decision.	
.	 .	 .	Faculty,	attorneys,	and	 law	students	voted	with	 their	 feet,	and	 their	 feet	 led	 them	 to	 the	com-
puter	terminal.”);	Judy	Meadows	&	Kay	Todd,	Our Question: Is the Use of Digests Changing?	13	
peRspeCtives: teaChing legal Res. & wRiting 113,	115	(2005)	(“When	.	.	.	all	print	digests	must	
be	cancelled,	the	librarian	probably	will	not	be	accused	of	misfeasance;	the	absence	of	print	digests	
may	not	even	be	noticed.”).
	 240.	 This	is	clearly	necessary	for	the	twentieth	century	and	beyond,	but	it	may	also	be	necessary	to	rethink	
the	importance	of	legislation	in	the	nineteenth	century.	See	supra	note	85.
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Internet	technologies	have	made	increasingly	accessible	to	researchers,	and	which	
will	perhaps	become	more	important	as	authority	now	that	they	are	reached	though	
means	similar	to	those	used	for	the	authorities	traditionally	viewed	as	primary.241	
The	same	may	be	true	for	nonlegal	materials	accessed	through	the	same	electronic	
sources	as	primary	and	secondary	legal	authorities.242
¶71	 It	will	 also	be	necessary	 to	 expand	our	 study	of	 the	 influences	of	 legal	
information	to	systems	outside	the	United	States	and	to	develop	approaches	that	
can	 be	 readily	 applied	 and	 tested	 beyond	 the	U.S.	 context,	 perhaps	 by	making	
more	use	of	the	research	methodologies	of	other	disciplines.	One	avenue	may	be	to	
think	more	about	the	roles	played	by	texts	and	documents	in	the	professional	dis-
course	of	law.	Anthropologist	Martin	Chanock	has	suggested	“that	the	major	task	
[of	legal	anthropology]	is	to	consider	the	different	uses	of	and	approach	to	texts	
.	 .	 .	 .	 [E]xplaining	 the	distinctive	nature	of	highly	 textualised	 legal	 systems	still	
remains	a	challenge.”243	John	Seely	Brown	and	Paul	Duguid	have	discussed	 the	
social	role	of	texts	and	documents	(“documents	do	not	merely	carry	information,	
they	help	make	it,	structure	it,	and	validate	it”244),	as	well	as	 the	ways	in	which	
disciplines,	professions,	and	other	communities	are	“bound	together	by	texts	and	a	
shared	disposition	toward	those	texts”245	in	ways	suggestive	for	the	study	of	legal	
information.246	How	do	the	number	of	texts	published	in	a	jurisdiction	and	their	
availability	 for	discussion	 and	analysis	 inform	 the	discourse	of	 the	professional	
community?	
¶72	Whatever	 directions	 our	 explorations	 take	 in	 the	 future,	 the	 core	 of	 the	
literature	on	the	influences	of	legal	information	will	continue	to	be	found	in	Bob	
Berring’s	writings	and	in	those	of	others	who	have	taken	seriously	the	questions	
he	raises	concerning	the	impacts	of	the	forms	and	structures	of	legal	information	
on	the	American	legal	culture.	The	literature	stimulated	by	Bob’s	work	continues	
to	be	vibrant,	and	it	will	become	increasingly	interdisciplinary	and	international	
in	scope.	For	 law	librarians,	 it	 is	 the	 locus	of	 the	best	of	our	own	literature	and	
professional	knowledge.
	 241.	 See	Michael	W.	Carroll,	The Movement for Open Access Law,	10	lewis & ClaRK l. Rev. 741	(2006)	
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